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The United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (“EPA”) has encouraged
Supplemental Environmental Projects
(“SEPs”) for more than a decade as part of
the agency’s efforts to protect and enhance
public health and the environment.1   SEPs
are environmentally beneficial projects vol-
untarily undertaken by violators of environ-
mental laws, for which EPA may partially
mitigate the civil penalties they would oth-
erwise face.2   The EPA reported that during
fiscal year 2002, 10 percent of the EPA’s civil
judicial and administrative settlements in-
cluded SEPs valued at $56.5 million.3   The
use of SEPs may be characterized as part of
a larger trend away from the traditional de-
terrence-based model, where regulators
identify violators and fine them amounts
that exceed the economic benefit derived
from the violations; instead, this new model
of environmental enforcement encom-
passes self-reporting of violations, commu-
nity group input, and innovative “win, win”
solutions to environmental problems.4
Most major environmental laws are
enforced under a “cooperative federalism”
model, as the states implement and enforce
the major environmental laws with the EPA
overseeing and supporting its minimum
standards and procedural requirements.5
Although all SEP policies have common fea-
tures as a result of the EPA’s leadership and
memoranda of understanding executed
with the states, they also vary across states
in response to local needs and politics.  This
report is primarily concerned with the SEP
policies and practices of the various states.
However, since the federal example has dra-
matically influenced state policy and re-
mains the chief source of principles, legal
precedents, and case law, it is necessary to
first set out the federal background against
which the state policies operate.  The re-
port is structured with this in mind.
1. United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Policy on the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects in EPA
Settlements (Feb. 12, 1991) (on file with West-Northwest);
Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environmental
Projects Policy Issued, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,856, 24,857 (May
8, 1995) [hereinafter Interim Revised EPA Supplemental En-
vironmental Projects Policy]; Jeff Ganguly, Environmental
Remediation Through Supplemental Environmental Projects and
Creative Negotiation: Renewed Community Involvement in Fed-
eral Enforcement, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 189, 207 (1998).
2. Final EPA Supplemental Environmental
Project Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,796, 24,797-98
(May 5, 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/com-
pliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/fnlsup-hermn-
mem.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Fi-
nal SEP Policy]. The EPA refers to entities undertaking
SEPs as defendants/respondents; for purposes of con-
cision, the report refers to them as violators, though
guilt is rarely acknowledged in the decree.
3. Expanding the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects,
Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, Assistant EPA
Administrator, to EPA Assistant Administrators and En-
forcement Staff 1 (June 11, 2002), available at http://
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/
seps-expandinguse.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2004).
4. See, generally, Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Co-
operation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental Enforcement,
71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181 (1998) (discussing the shift from a
deterrence-based model to a compliance-based one). Cf.
Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE
L.J. 389, 403 (2003) (similarly, the Occupational Health
and Safety Administration may settle workplace violation
cases if violators agree to undertake additional safety mea-
sures at work locations not cited for violations).
5. Joel Mintz, Scrutinizing Environmental Enforcement:
A Comment on a Recent Discussion at the AALs, 17 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. LAW 127, 130 (2001); David L. Markell, The Role of
Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a ‘Reinvented’ State/Federal
Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, at 35 (2000).  Federal oversight over
delegated state enforcement actions includes the pos-
sibility of “overfiling,” or parallel federal enforcement
actions brought against violators that EPA considers
too leniently treated by the states.  The specter of
overfiling has compelled some states to hew closely to
the EPA’s Final SEP Policy, to avoid settlements with in-
adequate cash penalties. This risk cannot be overstated,
however, as our research turned up no cases in which
EPA had brought a second enforcement action to re-
cover against a settlement with overly lenient SEP.
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Structure of the Report
The report first examines the salient
legal issues surrounding SEPs, including 1)
a summary of current federal law as it ap-
plies to SEPs, 2) an inquiry into the mean-
ing and authority of the state and federal
guidelines, and, 3) a look at the policy im-
plications of SEPs.  Next, this report sets
out a discussion of “model practices” and
the values that they advance.  For readers
interested in the full results of the fifty state
survey, it will be available on the web in the
Summer of 2005, on the website of the
American Bar Association, Section on Indi-
vidual Rights & Responsibilities, Environ-
mental Justice Committee (www.abanet.org/
irr/committees/environmental).
Summary of Findings
The results of the fifty state survey in-
dicate that thirty states have instituted for-
mal, published SEP policies in the form of
legislation, or executive agency regulation
or guidelines.  Only thirteen states rely on
informal, unwritten practices in negotiating
SEPs.  This represents a significant increase
in the number of states with formal policies
over the past eight years, up from nineteen
states with formal policies or statutes, as
indicated in the only prior survey of state
SEP practices.6   Two states, North Carolina
and South Carolina, have rejected the use
of SEPs in settlements as a matter of policy
or law.  In addition, eight states expressly
include environmental justice as a factor in
their SEP policies: New Mexico, Colorado,
Utah, Virginia, Florida, Oregon, Massachu-
setts and Connecticut.7
This report argues against leaving the
negotiation of SEPs to the unfettered discre-
tion of enforcement personnel, because of
the lack of transparency and equity to both
violators and affected communities.  The re-
port also notes the prevalence of a nexus re-
quirement, or mandatory connection be-
tween a violation and the SEP, from various
bodies of law; this convergence of doctrine,
as well as the strong policy reasons
undergirding nexus outlined in Section III,
provide a strong basis for state inclusion of a
variant of nexus in their policies.  In addi-
tion, this report will set out a variety of model
SEP practices which, we will argue, serve three
broad sets of values—a collaborative model
of environmental enforcement, interests
unique to the states, and the perpetuation
of public interest that lies at the core of envi-
ronmental laws and regulations.
I.  EPA SEP Guidelines and Memoranda
Definition of SEPs
Supplemental Environmental Projects
(SEPs) are environmentally beneficial
projects that go beyond compliance and are
undertaken as part of a settlement of an
enforcement action, EPA may mitigate a
portion of the civil penalty that otherwise
might have been assessed.8   The project
must improve, protect or reduce risks to
public health or the environment.9   Further,
the project must be implemented entirely
after the EPA has identified a violation in
order to be part of a “settlement of an en-
forcement action.”10   Finally, SEPs are vol-
untary endeavors and may not be already
6. HAZARDOUS WASTE ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE, ASS’N OF
STATE AND TERRITORIAL SOLID WASTE MGMT. OFFICIALS, SUPPLE-
MENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS: SURVEY OF STATES AND TERRITO-
RIES (Oct. 1997), available at http://www.astswmo.org/Pub-
lications/pdf/sepsur.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2004).
7. For a discussion of environmental justice and
SEPs, see notes 198 to 211 and accompanying text, infra.
8. Final SEP Policy, supra note 2, 63 Fed. Reg. at
24,797-98.  Generally, the respondent to the civil en-
forcement action does not admit liability as part of
the consent decree; however, for ease of reference, the
report will use the term “violator” to indicate the party
against whom the enforcement action was brought.
9. Id. at 24,798.
10. Id.












mandated by law, either as part of injunctive
relief, as part of an existing settlement, or by
state or local requirements.11
Legal Principles12
Over the decades, EPA’s SEP policies
have evolved from informal practices into a
body of guidelines and memoranda.  The
1998 Final SEP Policy and the 2002 Supple-
mental Environmental Projects (SEP) Policy
memorandum are designed to ensure that
SEPs do not exceed the Federal
Government’s authority and do not run
afoul of any statutory requirements, espe-
cially the Miscellaneous Receipts Act
(“MRA”) and other applicable principles of
appropriations law.13   Specifically, the EPA
principles preserve the Congressional pre-
rogative to appropriate funds as provided
in the U.S. Constitution.14   The EPA prin-
ciples require the following:
1. A project cannot be inconsistent with
the statutes that gave rise to the violation.15
2. “All penalties must be deposited
into the US Treasury unless otherwise au-
thorized by law.”16
3. All projects must further an objec-
tive in the violated statute and contain an
adequate nexus to the violation.17   EPA pro-
vides examples of nexus as follows:
a. “The project is designed to reduce
the likelihood that similar violations will
occur in the future”; or
b. “The project reduces the adverse im-
pact to the public health or the environment to
which the violation at issue contributes”; or
c.  “The project reduces the overall risk
to public health or the environment poten-
tially affected by the violation at issue.”18
4. EPA cannot control or manage the
SEP or its funds.19
5. The type and scope of each project
must be defined in a settlement agreement.20
6. “A project cannot be used to satisfy
EPA’s statutory obligation or another fed-
eral agency’s obligations to perform a par-
ticular activity.”21
7. “A project may not provide EPA or any
federal agency with additional resources to
perform a particular activity for which Con-
11. Id.
12. Id. The Final SEP Policy uses the term “guide-
lines,” but “principles” will be used within this report
to encompass the broader set of guidance given by
the totality of the EPA SEP memoranda, as well as
the individual states’ SEP policies.
13. Miscellaneous Receipts Act, 31 U.S.C. §
3301(b)(2000) (directing that all assessed penalties be
deposited in the U.S. Treasury); Supplemental Environmen-
tal Projects (SEP) Policy 1, Memorandum from Sylvia K.
Lawrence, Acting Assistant EPA Administrator, to EPA
Regional Administrators and Regional Counsel 1-2
(Mar. 22, 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/compli-
ance/resources/policies/civil/seps/sepguide-mem.pdf
(last visited Dec. 15, 2004) [hereinafter SEP Policy Memo-
randum].  For more detail on the legal questions sur-
rounding the legal framework  of the EPA Policy, please
consult Section II, “The Federal Law of SEPs.”
14. Importance of the Nexus Requirement in the Supplemen-
tal Environmental Projects Policy 2, Memorandum from
Walker B. Smith, Director, EPA Office of Regulatory En-
forcement, to EPA Regional Counsel and Division Di-
rectors  (Oct. 31, 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/sepnexus-
mem.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Impor-
tance of the Nexus Requirement in SEP Policy]
15 SEP Policy Memorandum, supra note 13, at 1.
16 Id. For purposes of precision, much of the fed-
eral guideline language cited is verbatim or nearly so.
17 Importance of the Nexus Requirement in SEP Policy,
supra note 14, at 1-2.
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gress has specifically appropriated funds.”22
8. “A project may not provide addi-
tional resources to support specific activi-
ties performed by EPA employees or EPA
contractors.”23
9. “A project may not provide a federal
grantee with additional funds to perform a
specific task identified within an assistance
agreement.”24
10. Projects that involve only contribu-
tions to a charitable or civic organization are
not acceptable.25
Categories of SEPs
In order for a project to be accepted as a
SEP, it must fit within at least one of the fol-
lowing categories and satisfy all other require-
ments established in the Final SEP Policy:26
1. Public Health projects provide “diagnos-
tic, preventative and/or remedial health care.”
2. Pollution Prevention projects reduce the
amount or toxicity of pollution produced.
3. Pollution Reduction projects reduce the
amount or toxicity of pollution already re-
leased.
4. Environmental Restoration and Protection
projects “enhance the condition of the eco-
system or immediate geographic area ad-
versely affected” by the violation.
5. Assessments and Audits examine internal
operations to determine if other pollution
problems exist or if operations could be im-
proved to avoid future violations.  Pollution
prevention assessments, environmental qual-
ity assessments, and environmental compli-
ance audits are listed as possible projects.
6. Environmental Compliance Promotion
projects help others in the regulated com-
munity to maintain compliance and reduce
pollution.
7. Emergency Planning and Preparedness
projects provide non-cash assistance to re-
sponsible state or local emergency response
or planning entities.
8. Other projects have environmental
merit, but must be approved by the case
team and must be otherwise fully consis-
tent with all other requirements of the Final
SEP Policy.
9. Projects that are not acceptable as
SEPs include general public environmental
awareness projects, contributions to envi-
ronmental research at a college or univer-
sity, projects that are unrelated to environ-
mental protection (e.g., donating play-
ground equipment), studies or assessments
without a requirement to address the prob-
lems identified in the study, and projects
which the violator will undertake with some
form of federal financial assistance or non-
financial assistance (e.g., loan guarantees).
Calculation of the Final Penalty
Although the Final SEP Policy encour-
ages violators to undertake environmentally
beneficial projects, the Policy explains that
a minimum cash penalty is still an impor-
tant part of any settlement for reasons of
deterrence and fairness.27   The EPA calcu-
lates the final penalty in a five-step process.28
The first step involves calculating the
settlement amount without the SEP, con-
sidering the circumstances and extent of the
violation.29   The applicable media-specific
22. Id.
23. Id. at 24,798-99.
24. Id. at 24,799.
25. Id. at 24,801.
26. Id. at 24,799-801.
27. Id. at 24,801.
28. Id. at 24,801-802.
29 Id. at 24,801.












EPA penalty policy is used to determine the
“gravity component”—which weighs the se-
verity of the violation, and provides the de-
terrent effect of the civil penalty.  Adjusting
the gravity component by such factors as
good faith efforts to comply, cooperation,
and litigation risk, and adding this to the
economic benefit of noncompliance yields
the “settlement amount,” or minimum
settlement penalty, in the absence of a SEP.
The second step is to determine the
minimum cash penalty amount when there
is a SEP.30   The minimum penalty must be
the greater of 1) the economic benefit of
noncompliance plus 10 percent of the grav-
ity component or 2) 25 percent of the grav-
ity component.31
Third, the SEP’s cost is computed us-
ing a computer program called “PROJECT.”32
The program considers three types of SEP
costs, including capital costs (e.g., equip-
ment, buildings), one-time nondepreciable
costs (e.g., removing contaminated materi-
als, purchasing land), and annual operation
costs and savings.  The program also con-
siders whether a violator will deduct the SEP
expenditures from its income taxes.  The
resulting, after-tax SEP cost is the maximum
amount that EPA may take into account
when mitigating the penalty amount.
Fourth, the EPA determines the mitiga-
tion percentage (i.e., the percentage of pen-
alty offset afforded each dollar of SEP costs)
and the mitigation amount (i.e., the net
amount of penalty offset).33   Factors consid-
ered in calculating the mitigation percentage
include the benefits to the public and envi-
ronment at large, the innovativeness of the
project, the extent to which the SEP reduces
risk to minority or low-income populations,
the extent to which the violator seeks com-
munity input, the multimedia impact of the
project, and the extent to which the project
achieves pollution prevention.  The better
the project performs in each of these cat-
egories, the greater the mitigation percent-
age will be.  The mitigation percentage can-
not exceed 80 percent of the SEP cost, save
for projects of outstanding quality under-
taken by small businesses, government
agencies and non-profits, and for outstand-
ing pollution prevention projects for all types
of entities.  These projects may receive 100
percent mitigation. 34   Once the mitigation
percentage is determined, the mitigation
amount is calculated by multiplying the per-
centage by the SEP costs.
Fifth, the final settlement penalty is
calculated.35   This final penalty is the great-
est amount of either the second step’s 1) 10
percent of the gravity component plus the
economic benefit of noncompliance or 2)
25 percent of the gravity component; or the
SEP mitigation amount subtracted from the
initial settlement amount (i.e., economic
benefit plus the adjusted gravity compo-
nent) without the SEP.36
Oversight and Drafting Enforceable SEPs
The Final SEP Policy specifies that the
settlement agreement should accurately
and completely describe the SEP.37   It
should describe the actions to be performed
by the violator and provide objective means




33. Id. at 24,802.
34. Id. In cases of 100 percent mitigation, each
dollar spent on a SEP offsets a dollar from the initial
penalty calculation.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 24,802.
37. Id. at 24,803.
38. Id.
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violator may be required to submit periodic
reports to the EPA.39   A violator should be
required to quantify the benefits associated
with the project and provide EPA with a re-
port setting forth how the benefits were
measured or estimated.40   The violator
“should agree that whenever it publicizes a
SEP or the results of a SEP, it will state in a
prominent manner that the project is being
undertaken as part of the settlement of an
enforcement action.”41   The EPA provides a
model consent agreement and order to as-
sist settlement negotiators with these re-
quirements.42
Liability for Nonperformance of a SEP and
Stipulated Penalties
Violators are responsible and liable for
ensuring that a SEP is completed satisfac-
torily.43   According to the Final SEP Policy, if
a SEP is not completed satisfactorily, the
violator should be required, pursuant to the
settlement agreement, to pay stipulated
penalties.44   Stipulated penalties for failing
to satisfactorily perform a SEP range be-
tween 75 percent and 150 percent of the
mitigation value originally awarded to the
project.45   A violator may avoid the penalty
if good faith and timely efforts were made
to complete the work and at least 90 per-
cent of the funds budgeted for the SEP were
spent.46   Pursuant to the Final SEP Policy,
overestimating the cost of a SEP should also
be penalized, even if the SEP is successfully
completed. If the final cost of the SEP is less
than 90 percent of the projected cost, the
violator should pay stipulated damages,
between 10 percent and 25 percent of the
original mitigation awarded percent.47
Community Input
In appropriate cases, EPA should make
special efforts to seek input on proposed
projects by the community adversely affected
by a violation.48   In order to provide the com-
munity with information regarding possible
SEPs, the EPA negotiating team should seek
community input after the EPA knows the
violator is interested in conducting a SEP,
how much money is available for a SEP, and
that settlement is likely.49   The EPA Policy
notes that representatives of community or-
ganizations usually will not participate directly
in the settlement negotiation itself due to the
confidential nature of the negotiation and
the difficulty in determining which commu-
nity group should participate in the negotia-
tions.50   The negotiating team should use
informal methods of seeking input such as
making telephone calls to local organiza-
tions, local churches, local elected leaders,
or other groups.51   A public notice in a news-
paper may also be appropriate.52   The EPA
negotiating team, perhaps in conjunction
with the violator, should also provide infor-
mation about what SEPs are and the reason-





42. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
MODEL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS CONSENT AGREE-
MENT AND ORDER (Jan. 1, 1999), available at http://
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/
rcra/sepmodcao-rpt.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2004).
43. Final SEP Policy, supra note 2, 63 Fed. Reg. at
24,802. Further, a violator may not transfer liability to
another third party, although a violator may use con-
tractors or consultants to assist in implementing a SEP.






















In 2003, the EPA issued Interim Guid-
ance for Community Involvement in Supplemental
Environmental Projects, further encouraging
EPA regional offices to solicit community
input.54   The Interim Guidance did not signifi-
cantly change the existing policy; however,
it did recommend the use of “SEP libraries,”
archives of community suggestions for pos-
sible SEPs.55   In addition, SEPs implicating
community input continue to be eligible for
a higher mitigation percentage.56
The enumerated benefits of community
involvement include the promotion of envi-
ronmental justice, the enhancement of com-
munity awareness of EPA enforcement, and
the improvement of relations between the
community and the facility.57   And while the
memorandum encourages community in-
volvement, it is not a requirement for SEP
approvals.58   There are a number of factors
to consider in determining whether commu-
nity involvement may be appropriate in a
particular case.59   These factors include: the
parameters surrounding the particular case
(e.g., court-ordered deadlines); the willing-
ness of the violator to conduct the SEP and
consider community input; the impact of the
violation on the community; the level of in-
terest of the community in the particular fa-
cility or SEP; and the amount of the pro-
posed penalty and the settlement that is
likely to be mitigated by the SEP.60   Finally,
the memorandum includes appendices con-
taining resources for identifying communi-
ties and community outreach techniques.61
EPA Procedures
Generally, the authority of a govern-
ment official to approve a SEP is included
in the official’s authority to settle an en-
forcement case, and thus no special approv-
als are required.62   Situations in which spe-
cial approval is required include cases where
a project may not fully comply with the Fi-
nal SEP Policy, when a SEP would involve
activities outside the United States, and
where an environmental compliance promo-
tion project or project in the “other” category
is contemplated.63
The Final SEP Policy requires documen-
tation of cases in which SEPs are used as
part of a settlement.64   An explanation of
the SEP, a description of the expected ben-
efits of a SEP, and a description by the en-
forcement attorney of how nexus and other
legal requirements are satisfied are required
as part of the documentation.65   Such docu-
mentation and explanations of a particular
SEP may be confidential, exempt from the
Freedom of Information Act, and protected
by various privileges.66
54. Interim Guidance for Community Involvement
in Supplemental Environmental Projects, 68 Fed. Reg.
35,884 (June 17, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/resources/pol ic ies/c iv i l /seps/
sepcomm2003-intrm.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2004)
[hereinafter Interim Guidance for Community Involvement].
55. Id. at 35,887.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 35,886.
59. Id. at 35,887.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 35,888.
62. Final SEP Policy, supra note 2, 63 Fed. Reg. at
24,803-04.
63. Revised Approval Procedures for Supplemental Envi-
ronmental Projects, Memorandum from Eric V. Schaeffer,
Director, EPA Office of Regulatory Enforcement, to EPA
Regional Counsel, Directors, and Enforcement Coor-
dinators (July 21, 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/resources/pol ic ies/c iv i l /seps/
sepapprovrev-mem.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2004).
64 Final SEP Policy, supra note 2, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,804.
65 Id.
66 Id.
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Profitable SEPs
A 2003 EPA memorandum effected a
change in the Final SEP Policy to allow for
the acceptance, where appropriate, of SEPs
that may be ultimately profitable to the vio-
lators.67   The Memorandum first gives guid-
ance on how to calculate and detect profit-
able projects.68   First, SEP information is
entered into the PROJECT model that cal-
culates the annual costs and savings of a
SEP.69   Projects that are profitable (a project
with a net annual savings) within the first
five years of their implementation (or three
years for a small business) will be rejected.70
If the project is not profitable within that first
project period, personnel should next de-
termine whether the project will be profit-
able at fifteen years.71   Projects not profit-
able in their first fifteen years may be ac-
cepted.72   However, if a project will be prof-
itable in five to fifteen years (or between
three and fifteen years for small businesses)
the project may still be accepted if it meets
all other SEP Policy criteria and conditions
and “the benefits to the public are signifi-
cant despite the profit to the defendant.”73
However, those projects considered
profitable must meet a “high hurdle” in de-
termining the mitigation credit for the project;
the Memorandum explains that it would be
inappropriate for SEPs that are profitable to
receive the maximum allowable mitigation
credit.74   This “high hurdle” can be met if the
project demonstrates attributes such as: a
high degree of innovation with a potential
for widespread application; technology that
is transferable to other facilities or industries;
extraordinary environmental benefits that are
quantifiable; exceptional environmental or
public health benefits to an Environmental
Justice community; and/or a high degree of
economic risk for the alleged violator.75   The
better the project performs in each of these
areas, the higher the mitigation credit the
project will receive.  As a ceiling, EPA’s Office
of Enforcement and Compliance Assistance
recommends a maximum upper mitigation
percentage of 80 percent for profitable pol-
lution prevention SEPs and a maximum up-
per mitigation percentage of 60 percent for
all other profitable SEPs.76
Aggregation of Funds
A later memorandum clarifies the EPA’s
position on aggregating separate SEPs in a
larger project.77   The Memorandum explains
that aggregation would be allowed but not
where EPA would be required to hold or
manage the aggregated project funds.78
Two examples of permissible aggrega-
tion are described.79   In one situation, sepa-
rate violators pool resources to hire a con-
67. Guidance for Determining Whether a Project is
Profitable, When to Accept Profitable Projects as Supple-
mental Environmental Projects, and How to Value Such
Projects, Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, Assis-
tant EPA Administrator, to EPA Regional Counsel and
Division Directors 5 (Dec. 5, 2003), available at http://
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/
seps-profitableprojects.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
68. Id. at 8-9.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id. at 8.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 8-9.
74. Id. at 6.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Guidance Concerning the Use of Third Parties
and the Performance of SEPs and the Aggregation of SEP
Funds, Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, Assistant
EPA Administrator, to EPA Regional Counsel, Enforce-
ment Managers, Enforcement Coordinators and Division
Directors 1 (December 15, 2003), available at http://
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/
seps-thirdparties.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
78 Id. at 3.
79 Id. at 2.












tractor to manage and/or implement a con-
solidated SEP.80   This type of project is per-
missible as long as the project is “carefully
crafted” so that the violators remain liable
in the same manner as they would under a
typical settlement.81   In the second situa-
tion, separate violators perform discrete and
segregable projects within a larger one.82
Such a project is permissible as long as the
violators remain liable for the implementa-
tion and completion of a specific portion of
the larger project. 83   EPA, on the other hand,
may not aggregate funds in a SEP account
to be used at a later time as the Miscella-
neous Receipts Act prohibits the EPA from
managing SEP funds.84
Third Parties
The same memorandum also clarifies
that a violator may use a private, third party
organization to manage SEPs and SEP
funds.  EPA may not use private, third par-
ties to complete a SEP since such a rela-
tionship could create the appearance that
EPA is using the organization to indirectly
manage or direct SEP funds, in violation of
the Miscellaneous Receipts Act.85   There is
no such concern when violators contract
with third party organizations to manage
and/or complete a SEP, as long as a few con-
ditions are met.86   A violator must be obli-
gated to complete the SEP satisfactorily,
must fully expend the amount of funds
agreed to be spent in performance of the
SEP, and the project must fulfill the require-
ments of the SEP Policy.87   Further, the
Memorandum underscores that the viola-
tor cannot merely use third parties to as-
sist in implementing a SEP and avoid full
legal responsibility for the implementation
of the SEP.88
II.  The Law of SEPs
Applicability to the States
What follows is a discussion of the law
of SEPs, with a focus on federal case law
and administrative materials. The lessons
gleaned are applicable to the states as well.
For instance, most state environmental pro-
tection agencies find themselves in the
same position as EPA, fashioning settle-
ments not expressly authorized by their leg-
islatures.  PLRI has uncovered no state court
cases finding that a state environmental
agency overstepped its statutory authority
in implementing SEPs, so it is impossible
to assert with certainty that states must
adopt an EPA-styled nexus requirement, as
well as other EPA policies.89  Nevertheless,
many states have adopted the EPA nexus
requirement as a means of deflecting any
criticism of their environmental penalty poli-
cies.  As seen in the following sections, there
are strong policy grounds for invoking a form





84. Id. at 4.
85. Id. at 5. A more complete discussion of the
Miscellaneous Receipts Act ensues in Section II of
this report, “The Law of SEPs.” EPA may not directly
or indirectly manage SEP funds.
86. Id. at 4.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Idaho’s Constitution echoes the federal Mis-
cellaneous Receipts Act.  Idaho Const. art. VII, § 13
(“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in
pursuance of appropriations made by law.”); also, it
should be noted that SEPs have been categorically
rejected in the state of North Carolina, based on a
clause in the state constitution requiring all civil pen-
alties to be directed to a civil penalty forfeiture fund.
Craven County Bd. of Educ. v. Boyles, 343 N.C. 87, 92, 468
S.E.2d 50, 53 (1996) (citing N.C. Const. art. IX, § 7).
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The Federal Picture
No Congressional act expressly autho-
rizes EPA to accept SEPs in mitigation of
civil enforcement penalties.  That said, EPA
enjoys broad authority to bring enforcement
actions and discretion in settling them, in
accordance with the underlying objectives
of the environmental statutes.90   Moreover,
PLRI research indicates that no court has
ever invalidated an EPA-approved settle-
ment with a SEP.91   This section will take a
closer look at the statutory authorities and
prosecutorial discretion of EPA, and the
objections raised by the Federal General
Accounting Office (“GAO”) to the early ver-
sions of EPA’s SEP policy, with the caveat
that this section aims less at resolving the
precise nature of EPA’s SEP authority and
more at underscoring the legal issues that
should be considered by the states as they
move forward with their SEP policies and
statutes.  Of particular interest is the con-
tinual reappearance in various legal doc-
trines of “nexus,” or the connection between
the statutory violation and the supplemen-
tal environmental project.  Though most
states are not legally constrained to require
nexus, it might benefit them to include a
mild variant of nexus within their policies,
in furtherance of circumspect use of their
EPA-delegated powers. 92
Congress has never expressly autho-
rized EPA (or the United States) to accept a
lower settlement penalty in exchange for the
performance of environmentally beneficial
projects.93   Some federal statutes contain
provisions that implicitly support EPA’s use
of SEPs in settlement agreements, however.
The Toxic Substances Control Act specifi-
cally allows EPA to pursue “settlements with
conditions.”94   The Clean Air Act (“CAA”)
also expressly grants EPA the authority to
“compromise, modify, or remit, with or with-
out conditions,” any administrative penal-
ties under the Act.95   However, there is no
specific authority for EPA to settle suits with
conditions in other environmental stat-
utes.96
EPA’s interpretation of its authority
under the CAA, as allowing consent decrees
with SEPs, gains support from long congres-
90. Marshall J. Breger, The Fiftieth Anniversary of the
Administrative Procedure Act: Past and Prologue: Regulatory
Flexibility and the Administrative State, 32 TULSA L.J. 325,
338 (1996)(“Traditional doctrines of prosecutorial dis-
cretion have given a wide range of discretionary au-
thority to regulators to ‘plea bargain’ or settle cases.”).
91. In one of the few judicial pronouncements
close to being on point, a federal court observed that
briefing materials did not provide evidence of the “clear
Congressional authorization for the EPA’s agreeing to
the SEP” in a particular consent decree, but the court
did not comment on the scope of EPA authority further.
United States v. Atofina Chemicals, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15137, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2002).
92. Some commentators suggest that that nexus
should serve as a policy tool, to ensure that projects
benefit the communities affected by the violations,
and while others observe that the legal fine points of
nexus can undercut the restorative goal that should
be the sine qua non of SEP policies.
93. Laurie Droughton, Supplemental Environmental
Projects: A Bargain for the Environment, 12 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 789 (1995).  One provision of the Clean Air Act
does permit up to $100,000 of civil penalties assessed
to be directed to a special fund used for air pollution
compliance and enforcement projects.  42 U.S.C. §
7406(g).  Settlements with SEPs do not constitute
“civil penalties” within the meaning of this provision.
94. Toxic Substances Control Act § 16(a)(2)(C),
15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(C) (2005) (specifically allow-
ing EPA to “compromise, modify or remit, with or with-
out conditions, any civil penalty which may be im-
posed under this subsection”).
95. Clean Air Act §§ 113(d)(2)(B), 304(g)(2), 42
U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2)(B) (2005).
96. David Dana, The Uncertain Merits of Environmen-
tal Enforcement Reform: The Case of SEPs, 1998 WIS. L. REV.
1181, 1183 (1998).












sional inaction in the face of a decade and
a half of settlements with SEPs.  While there
is a “general reluctance of courts to rely on
congressional inaction as a basis for statu-
tory interpretation . . . under certain circum-
stances, inaction by Congress may be inter-
preted as legislative ratification of or acqui-
escence to an agency’s position.”97   Relevant
factors include whether Congress has held
hearings on the issue as well as Congress’
awareness of the agency action in consider-
ing related legislation.98   Congress has long
been aware of EPA’s practice of including
SEPs in settlements.99   The Conference
Committee Report discussing what would
become of the 1987 amendments to the
Clean Water Act noted:
In certain instances settlements of fines
and penalties levied due to NPDES per-
mit and other violations have been used
to fund research, development and
other related projects which further the
goals of the Act.  In these cases, the
funds collected in connection with these
violations were used to investigate pol-
lution problems other than those lead-
ing to the violation.  Settlements of this
type preserve the punitive nature of en-
forcement actions while putting the
funds collected to use on behalf of en-
vironmental protection.  Although this
practice has been used on a selective
basis, the conferees encourage this
procedure where appropriate.100
Hence, it may be argued that this lan-
guage amounts to approbation of EPA’s SEP
practices, even though Congress has not
passed legislation that would clarify EPA’s
SEP authority.
EPA’s General Enforcement Discretion
While Congress has never given explicit
authorization for the use of SEPs, Congress
has, of course, authorized EPA to enforce
federal environmental statutes.  EPA’s au-
thority to enforce environmental statutes
carries with it the broad discretion to de-
cide how to prosecute or whether to pros-
ecute at all.101   This discretion is almost to-
tally unreviewable by the judiciary.102   The
authority to enforce also includes the au-
thority to settle an enforcement action.103
Consequently, EPA’s authority to include
one or more SEPs in a consent decree falls
within this broad discretion to administer
and enforce environmental laws.  Courts are
hesitant to interfere with the inner workings
of an agency’s allocation of its scarce re-
sources in prioritizing among possible en-
97. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d
155, 170 (4th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) (finding sup-
port in Congressional inaction for FDA’s historic inter-
pretation that it would exceed its statutory authority in
regulating the sale and distribution of tobacco).
98. Id.
99. Dana, supra note 96, at 1221; “EPA does not keep
use of SEPs a secret.  Indeed, in testimony before con-
gressional committees, EPA officials have touted the
SEPs as evidence of the Agency’s commitment to im-
prove upon older models of environmental regulation.
See, e.g., Environmental Issues: Hearing on H.R. 1924,
H.R. 1925, & H.R. 2015 Before the Subcomm. on Transp.
& Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 103d Cong. 155, 157 (1993) (statement of
Kathleen Aterno, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office
of Administration and Resources Management, EPA).”
100. H.R. Rep. No. 99-1004, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
at 139 (Oct. 15, 1986) (emphasis added).
101. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (an
agency’s discretion not to prosecute or enforce is gener-
ally committed to the agency’s absolute discretion); see
also Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 902-03 (9th Cir.
2001) (finding that Congress imposed no mandatory
enforcement duty within the provisions or legislative
history of the CWA, even when EPA finds a violation).
102. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 823.
103. See, e.g., Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers v. Oc-
cupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 671 F.2d 643,
650 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (necessarily included within an
agency’s prosecutorial power is the discretion to with-
draw or settle a claim).
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forcement actions:
[A]n agency decision not to enforce
often involves a complicated balanc-
ing of a number of factors which are
peculiarly within its expertise. Thus,
the agency must not only assess
whether a violation has occurred,
but whether agency resources are
best spent on this violation or an-
other, whether the agency is likely
to succeed if it acts, whether the par-
ticular enforcement action re-
quested best fits the agency’s over-
all policies, and, indeed, whether the
agency has enough resources to un-
dertake the action at all.104
This deference to agency internal re-
source allocations may also cover the deci-
sion-making process of EPA in granting SEPs,
permitting EPA to determine how to achieve
the broad goals of environmental enforce-
ment by promoting SEP-related pollution
reduction and prevention, as well as achiev-
ing extrinsic goals, such as promoting a col-
laborative relationship among violators, af-
fected communities and the EPA itself.  The
broad power that EPA enjoys to mitigate or
abandon civil enforcement actions would
appear to include the lesser power to settle
an action by incorporating a SEP.105
104. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831.
105. Section 309(d) of the Clean Water Act requires
a court to consider a defendant’s good faith effort at
compliance in assessing an appropriate penalty for
Clean Water Act violations.  33 U.S.C. § 1319(d ).  This
suggests that the Congressional scheme envisions that
some violators will be treated more leniently, based on
the individualized nature of their violations; the SEP
policy is another expression of this broad intent.
106. Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718
F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Union
Carbide Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 1219, 104 S. Ct. 2668 (1984).
107. Id. at 1121.
108. Id. at 1125.
109. Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,
478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) (holding that a voluntary consent
decree’s relief is not limited to the types of relief set out in
the statute giving rise to the lawsuit, as “the parties’ con-
sent animates the legal force of a consent decree.”).  Local
No. 93 and other cases establish that a court has the power
to enter and enforce consent decrees with provisions be-
yond the underlying statute’s remedies; courts will retain
jurisdiction over this type of consent decree.  See, e.g., Jeff D.
v. Kempthorne, 365 F.3d 844, 853 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[E]ven
assuming that defendants are no longer in violation of
federal law, the district court continues to vindicate fed-
eral interests by ensuring that its judgment is enforced.”).
Steven Bonorris, et al
198
Going Beyond the Relief Outlined in the
Statute through Consent Decrees
That the form of relief proposed in a
settlement with a SEP is greater than that
outlined in the statute does not in itself in-
validate the settlement.  In different contexts
courts have upheld the legality of consent
decrees that go beyond the express relief
outlined in a statute, with the proviso that
the decrees are consistent with the under-
lying purpose of the statute.  For example,
in Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, a
citizen suit was brought against the Admin-
istrator of the EPA for not implementing
certain provisions of the Clean Water Act.106
The court approved a consent decree requir-
ing the EPA to promulgate guidelines and
limitations governing the discharge of pol-
lutants even though the decree was more
extensive and specific than required by the
Clean Water Act.107   The court upheld pro-
visions of the consent decree that were
“consistent with” the underlying statute, and
expressly did not require that the provisions
“track” the language of the statute.108
In a different context, in Local No. 93,
International Association of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, the Supreme Court has held that











110. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 526.
111. Id. at 525.
112. GAO Opinion B-247155, 1992 WL 726317
(Comp. Gen.) (July 7, 1992) (holding that EPA’s dis-
cretionary authority to “compromise, or remit, with or
without conditions,” civil penalties assessed under
CAA section 205 empowers EPA to adjust penalties
to reflect the special circumstances of the violation
or concessions exacted from the violator, but does
not extend to remedies unrelated to the correction of
the violation in question); GAO Opinion B- 247155.2,
1993 WL 798227 (Comp. Gen.) (March 1, 1993).
113. GAO Opinion B-238419, 1990 WL 293769  (Comp.
Gen.), 70 Comp. Gen. 17 (Oct. 9, 1990); GAO Opinion B-
210210, 1983 WL 197623 (Comp. Gen.) (Sept. 14, 1983).
114. GAO Opinion B-238419, 1990 WL 293769,
at *2, 70 Comp. Gen. 17, at 19.
115. GAO Opinion B-247155, 1992 WL 726317, at *3.
116. Miscellaneous Receipts Act, 31 U.S.C. §
3301(b) (2000) (directing that all assessed penalties
be deposited in the U.S. Treasury); Anti-Deficiency
Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (prohibiting agency expendi-
tures in excess of Congressional appropriations).
117. United States v. Smithfield Foods, 982 F. Supp.
373, 374 (E. D. Va. 1997) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3302(c)(1)).
118. Id.
119. GAO Opinion B-247155.2, 1993 WL 798227,
Environmental Enforcement in the Fifty States — SEPs
199
taining relief that the court itself could not
grant after a trial.109   The Court held that it
was unnecessary to examine the precise lim-
its of the underlying statute, because its lim-
its “are not implicated by voluntary agree-
ments.”110   However, some provisos remain:
the consent decree must itself be legal,
within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction,
within the general scope of the complaint,
and must further the objectives of the law
upon which the complaint was based.111
Thus, the Court shifted the inquiry away
from the issue of the general legality of SEPs
to whether a specific SEP is consistent with
and enjoys a nexus to the underlying envi-
ronmental statute.  That these conditions
so closely track the core elements of EPA’s
current SEP Policy is a significant conver-
gence of legal doctrines.
The GAO Opinions and the Miscellaneous
Receipts Act
In the early 1990s, the GAO has twice
opined that EPA lacked the authority to
settle mobile source pollution enforcement
actions under the Clean Air Act by agreeing
to accept reduced penalties in exchange for
a violator’s agreement to perform public
awareness SEPs.112   In particular, the GAO
found that the implementation of SEPs that
furthered the aims of statutes not related to
the violation itself ran against a line of GAO
opinions, which interpreted statutes simi-
lar to the Clean Air Act.113   The GAO had
previously found that the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission’s authority to “compro-
mise, mitigate or remit” penalties did not
extend to reducing penalties in exchange
for the funding of nuclear safety research at
a university for the university because, “in
all likelihood, [the university would have]
no relationship to the violation and [would
have suffered] no injury from the violation.”
114   Similarly, although EPA pointed to in-
dependent provisions within the Clean Air
Act that required EPA to improve public
knowledge of the effects of air pollution on
citizens’ health, the GAO was not persuaded
that there was a sufficient relationship to
the underlying violation.115
Moreover, the GAO was concerned that
allowing these public awareness SEPs
would circumvent the Miscellaneous Re-
ceipts Act (“MRA”) and the rule against the
augmentation of appropriations, appropria-
tions being a right reserved for Congress by
the Constitution.116   The MRA requires that
a “person having custody or possession of
public money must deposit the money with
the Treasury within a certain time limit.” 117
The MRA’s purpose is to ensure that Con-
gress retains control of the public purse and
to effectuate Congress’ constitutional au-
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at *1.
120. Id. at *2.
121. There is not a great deal of external support for
GAO’s contention equating expenditures on SEPs with civil
penalties received by an agency, with the possible excep-
tion of the SEC’s aggregating the cash portion of the penalty
with the funds allocated to a SEP for purposes of reporting
requirements under securities laws.  17 C.F.R. § 229.103.
122. Droughton, supra note 93, at 811.
123. Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects
Policy, supra note 1, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,856, 24,857; Final SEP
Policy, supra note 2, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,798.  Additionally, a
2002 memorandum underscores that all penalties must be
deposited into the U.S. Treasury unless otherwise autho-
rized by law and that projects that involve only contributions
to a charitable or civic organization are not acceptable. Supple-
mental Environmental Projects (SEP) Policy, supra note 13.
124. Importance of the Nexus Requirement in SEP Policy,
supra note 14 at 1-3.
125. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Interstate Paper
Corp., 1988 WL 156749 (S.D.Ga. 1988), 29 ERC (BNA) 1135
(court entered a consent decree for a citizen suit against a
CWA violator, notwithstanding the fact that the decree con-
tained a $27,500 grant to the Georgia Conservancy for educa-
tion of schoolchildren, bearing no nexus to the underlying
violation).  In general, courts will permit third party payments,
as long as there has been no adjudication of the violator’s
liability.  See Quan Nghiem, Comment: Using Equitable Discretion to
Impose Supplemental Environmental Projects Under the Clean Water Act,
24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 561 (1997); see also CFTC v. Samaru, 2001
U.S. App. LEXIS 26812, 26813 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that
restitution of the amount of the victim’s loss was not a civil
money penalty); see also Sierra Club v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc.,
909 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that consent de-
cree-based payments to environmental organizations are
not made in recognition of liability under the Clean Water Act
and hence are not civil penalties).
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opined that EPA oversteps its authority in
approving some SEPs as this diverts funds
from the Treasury and augments the amount
of funds available for environmentally ben-
eficial projects.119   The GAO further noted,
in its second opinion on the EPA’s approval
of SEPs for public awareness, that the pay-
ment of funds to third parties for the perfor-
mance of SEPs violates the MRA, even
though EPA never actually “received” the
funds in question.120   At its most extreme,
the GAO posture would imply that any pay-
ment pursuant to a SEP, independent of its
recipient, would result in an MRA violation.121
EPA has read the GAO’s opinions nar-
rowly and only applied them to mobile source
violations under the Clean Air Act, the focus
of the GAO opinions.122   And more fundamen-
tally, the conflict has been largely resolved by
EPA’s redrafting of its SEP policy in 1996 and
1998, which resulted in the removal of the
public awareness category of SEPs, in the ad-
herence to the nexus requirement, and in the
prohibition on funding of projects that have
already been authorized by Congress.123
Supplemental memoranda lay out EPA’s ar-
guments explicitly, namely that nexus estab-
lishes continuity between EPA’s authority over
the violation itself with the SEP conceptually
serving as a mitigating factor in setting the fi-
nal cash penalty.124   In addition, that the GAO
analysis has not influenced the courts, at least
in the context of citizen suits where liability
has not been acknowledged or adjudicated
(as is the case with SEPs in consent decrees
negotiated between EPA and violators): the
nexus requirement has not been required to
safeguard against MRA violations.125
Other Legal Considerations
The Legal Significance of Guidelines
In viewing the range of state SEP laws
and policies it becomes clear that specify-
ing SEP guidelines rather than leaving de-
cisions to ad hoc, departmental discretion
is preferred.  Such ad hoc decisions, as a
policy matter, can be problematic as they
can lead to possible abuses of the program,
and diminish predictability.  That said, even
when guidelines are specified, the meaning
of those guidelines remains unclear.   What
happens when a consent decree does not
comply with the EPA’s or a state’s SEP guide-
lines? Must a court enforce or reject the












126. United States v. Atofina Chems., Inc., 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15137, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2002).
127. Id. at *17; Final SEP Policy, supra note 2, 63
Fed. Reg. 24,804.
128. United States v. Atofina Chems., Inc., 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15137, at *17.
129. Id. at *18-19 (emphasis added).
130. Id.
131. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S.
825 (U.S. 1987).
132. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (U.S. 1994).
133. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
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have no apparent answers.
A recent decision from a U.S. District
Court expressed confusion regarding the
meaning and authority of SEP guidelines.
In Atofina v.United States, a non-party commu-
nity group objected to a proposed consent
decree between the EPA and defendant
chemical company after numerous viola-
tions of environmental statutes.126   The com-
munity group protested the SEP portion of
the consent decree, objecting that no part
of the SEP would be performed in the com-
munity where the violation occurred and did
not allow for community input, in contra-
diction of the EPA Policy.  While the court
held that an adequate nexus between the
SEP and the violation did in fact exist, it also
held that the EPA did not comply with its
own guidelines regarding community input.
The court questioned its role in this situ-
ation where the EPA SEP Policy was not fol-
lowed.  In trying to answer this question the
court looked to the EPA Policy and noted that
the EPA policy “states that it is ‘not intended
for use by EPA, defendants, respondents,
courts of administrative law judges at a hear-
ing or in trial.’  The decision to accept an SEP
is ‘purely within EPA’s discretion’ . . . The
Policy ‘does not create any rights, duties, or
obligations, implied or otherwise, in any third
parties.”127   The court responded to this lan-
guage and found it “unclear if violations of
the Policy require, or allow a court to reject a
consent decree.”128
Ultimately, the court referred to the
community input guideline as a recommen-
dation, writing that “there is no evidence the
EPA held a public meeting with the local
community, as the policy recommends.”129
This demonstrates that court did not view
the EPA guidelines as binding authority.  The
court went on to find that “[e]ven if the court
had the clear authority to enforce the terms
of the EPA policy, it lacks the power to
modify the consent decree by striking the
SEP and leaving the rest of the agreement
intact.”130   So, given the choice of rejecting
or accepting the consent decree, the court
entered the decree, finding the public inter-
est served by such action.
Although this case holds that a court
may enter a consent decree despite non-
compliance with the EPA Policy recommen-
dations on community input if the public
interest is met, questions still remain.  What
if a more substantial EPA Policy require-
ment, such as the adequate nexus require-
ment, were not met?  Further, what happens
on the state level when state SEP policies
are not followed?  The Atofina case highlights
the confusion regarding the meaning of the
EPA guidelines and hopefully began a dis-
course in the courts that will begin to clarify
the authority of such guidelines.
Nollan/Dolan and Nexus
Discussions regarding “nexus” may trig-
ger recollections of the two famous Supreme
Court cases, Nollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission131  and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 132  find-
ing impermissible governmental takings
under the Fifth Amendment.  The Nollan and
Dolan cases concerned variances from land
use regulations offered in exchange for dedi-
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134. Id.
135. Id. at 838-39. (“It is quite impossible to understand
how a requirement that people already on the public beaches
be able to walk across the Nollans’ property reduces any
obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house.”).
136. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
137. Id.
138. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584, 432 A.2d 12,
14-15 (1981)).
139. Final SEP Policy, supra note 2, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,798
and 24,802 (the EPA’s “mitigation percentage” automati-
cally renders the SEP’s cost proportional to the potential
penalty).  The recurrence of the concept of “nexus” in a
different context, signals to the states the penumbral sig-
nificance of relating a SEP to the underyling violation.
Legally, and as a policy matter (discussed in the following
section, infra), states benefit from including at least a mild
variant of nexus in their policies.
140. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687,
702 (U.S. 1999).  While there is some disagreement
about whether the Nollan/Dolan doctrine applies to other
forms of exactions besides those that require dedica-
tion of public land, there is little doubt that the doctrine
is precluded outside the domain of land use.  Mark
Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exac-
tions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 636
(2004); Sharone Brown, Administrative Mandamus as a Pre-
requisite to Inverse Condemnation: ‘Healing’ California’s Con-
fused Takings Law, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 99, 116-117 (1994).
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the California Coastal Commission de-
manded a lateral public easement across the
Nollans’ beachfront lot in exchange for a
permit to demolish an existing bungalow
and replace it with a three-bedroom
house.133   The public easement was de-
signed to connect two public beaches that
were separated by the Nollan’s property.134
Since the easement would not eliminate the
problems that the new construction would
cause, the Court found an absence of nexus
and declared the permit a taking under the
Fifth Amendment.135
In Dolan, the Court set out an additional
requirement:  exactions imposed by the city
must be “roughly proportionate” to the pro-
jected impact of the proposed develop-
ment.136   The Court stated, “the city must
make some sort of individualized determi-
nation that the required dedication is related
both in nature and extent to the impact of
the proposed development.”137
The parallels with the SEP context are
evident:  a violator of an environmental stat-
ute is offered a reduced penalty in exchange
for performance of a SEP, an environmental
project for the public good.  The violator
offered a SEP as part of a settlement agree-
ment could argue that the arrangement
makes for an impermissible Nollan-like tak-
ing, particularly in states where nexus is not
required for SEPs.138   Several practical con-
siderations stand in the way of this argu-
ment, however.  For one, it is unlikely that a
violator would seek to undo an agreement
that mitigated a potential cash penalty.  In
addition, the EPA’s Final SEP Policy requires
nexus and “rough proportionality,” would
likely satisfy the dictates of Nollan/Dolan.139
Most notably, however, the violator
could not argue a taking since the Nollan/
Dolan doctrine applies only to land use cases:
in 1999, the Supreme Court explained that,
“we have not extended the rough-proportion-
ality test of Dolan beyond the special context
of exactions—land-use decisions condition-
ing approval of development on the dedica-
tion of property to public use.”140   Therefore,
a violator discontent with its SEP could not
invoke the Nollan/Dolan doctrine.
III.  Policy Implications of Supplemental
Environmental Projects
In general, enforcement actions seek to
achieve several policy goals.  According to
the U.S. EPA:
Penalties promote environmental com-
pliance and help protect public health
by deterring future violations by the











141. Final SEP Policy, supra note 2, 63 Fed.Reg.
24,796-97.
142. E-mail from Susan Briggum, Director of En-
vironmental Affairs, Waste Management, Inc. (June
29, 2004) (on file with authors).
143. Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regu-
latory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits,
21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 86 (2002).
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by other members of the regulated com-
munity. Penalties help ensure a na-
tional level playing field by ensuring that
violators do not obtain an unfair eco-
nomic advantage over their competi-
tors who made the necessary expendi-
tures to comply on time. Penalties also
encourage regulated entities to adopt
pollution prevention and recycling tech-
niques in order to minimize their pol-
lutant discharges and reduce their po-
tential liabilities.141
In light of these overarching goals,
there are several competing policy issues
regarding the use of SEPs within the settle-
ment of enforcement actions:  How do SEPs
alter the policies behind the enforcement
of environmental statutes while promoting
other goals as well?
The Benefits of SEPs
Proponents of SEPs believe that SEPs
should be allowed as part of an enforcement
action for several reasons. When applied
judiciously, SEPs benefit all those in-
volved—the regulators, industry, the com-
munity, and the environment.  The presence
of a SEP policy shows the regulator’s will-
ingness to cooperate with the regulated in-
dustry, and allows the regulator to create
regulations and enforcement processes that
industry is more willing to abide by.  Indus-
try advocates point out that SEPs can ben-
efit communities through promoting envi-
ronmental and health improvements be-
yond regulatory minimums, and underscore
the “good neighbor” obligations of permit-
ted facilities.142
SEPs promote a cooperative relation-
ship between the regulator and the viola-
tor, to the benefit of both. In the view of in-
dustry groups and regulators, SEPs can ob-
viate litigation costs, allow for greater fair-
ness to the regulated industry, and increase
“popular support for the environmental regu-
latory endeavor.”143   Because of the nature
of environmental enforcement, the regula-
tor and the regulated industries will con-
tinually interact; an ongoing relationship
that is cooperative may make for a more ef-
fective mode of regulation by reducing
adversarial tensions.  In the words of one
state environmental attorney, “cooperative
enforcement may dissuade regulated firms
from making political attacks on the statu-
tory regime or the agency’s authority and
budgets and may shore up general public
support for the agency’s regulatory man-
date,”144  making regulatory enforcement less
contentious.  One commentator notes that
“rigidly punitive enforcement may be unde-
sirable, even if it results in net social ben-
efits such as reduced pollution, if it imposes
unfair burdens on individuals.”145
Without the kind of back-end coopera-
tive negotiation promoted by SEPs,
“[u]nfairness may inspire recalcitrance in
regulated firms that would otherwise com-
ply voluntarily.”146   In the eyes of the indus-
tries, their resistance to regulations—non-
compliance, concealment of procedure and
pollution by-product, delay in dealings with
regulators, and litigation challenging regu-
lations—are all justified by what they view
as “coercive, irrational, and suboptimal”
regulations.147   As a result, regulators may
144. Id. at 101.
145. Id. at 100.
146. Id.
147. Id.  While industry must continue to comply
with environmental regulations, SEP negotiations
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benefit from a collaborative, rather than
adversarial, relationship.
Resource scarcity . . . forces agencies to
seek cooperation to legitimate their au-
thority and streamline interactions with
the regulated community.  If the regu-
lated community challenges every action
taken by the agency, the agency’s mis-
sion may be substantially hindered.  And
if a regulated entity views the regulator’s
authority as illegitimate, it is more likely
to shirk compliance with imposed
regulations (and cover up that noncom-
pliance), which increases demand for
already scarce agency resources.148
Because violators may perform SEPs us-
ing new technologies or processes, regulators
may gain insight into new compliance and
pollution prevention techniques.  SEPs also
enable regulators to experiment with compli-
ance and pollution reduction techniques that
otherwise might not be attempted.
SEPs allow regulators to set the ground
for future regulator initiatives and pro-
grams by affording them opportunities
to experiment with new technologies
and management practices.  If, for ex-
ample, a technology is proved cost-ef-
fective in a SEP experiment, the regula-
tory agency may be able to justify re-
quiring the technology on a general in-
dustry basis.  If the technology instead
proves unworkable, the regulators know
not to advocate its general adoption.149
In addition, a violator may ordinarily be
unwilling to undertake technical improve-
ments due to the fears of “technical risk,
temporary impacts on production rates dur-
ing project implementation or a long pay-
back period.” 150  Colorado’s SEP guidelines
take this possibility into account, and the
state’s Department of Public Health and En-
vironment uses SEPs as a means of induc-
ing progressive pollution prevention/energy
efficiency projects.151   In turn, because regu-
lators often lack resources to pursue cutting
edge environmentally beneficial projects,
state SEP programs provide a laboratory for
innovation.  For example, the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection
states that the use of SEPs allows the more
efficient funding of projects than the agency
could normally pursue.152
Affected communities stand to benefit
from SEPs, as well, particularly as SEPs
encourage restorative justice.  The nexus re-
quirement in most SEP policies results in
local or regional environmental projects that
help the area that suffered from the violation
148. Id. at 110.
149. Dana, supra note 96, at 1201; see also Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Center for Technology, Policy & In-
dustrial Development, Report Summary Prepared for the
EPA Office of Enforcement: Recent Experience in Encour-
aging the Use of Pollution Prevention in Enforcement Settle-
ments (1994), at 2 (on file with the authors). (“[T]he enforce-
ment context has two distinct advantages. First, firms can
be motivated to innovate, i.e., to overcome the barriers to
pollution prevention innovation that often exist in firms,
through penalty reduction improved relations with the
Agency, and improved public relations . . . .  Second, since
the firm has committed to implement the innovative project
in its consent agreement with the Agency . . . there is a strong
incentive to stick with the project even when technical diffi-
culties arise. Enforcement thus creates a “window of oppor-
tunity” in which options for technological change receive
more serious consideration than usual.”).
150. COLO. DEP’T OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT,
FINAL AGENCY WIDE SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS POLICY
3 (June 2003), available at http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/
sep/CDPHESEPPolicy.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
151. Id.
152. PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, POLICY FOR THE ACCEPTANCE
OF COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH ASSESS-
MENT OF CIVIL PENALTY 2 (Sept. 18, 1999) (on file with authors).
153. Nghiem, supra note 125, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. at
566.  It should be noted that the nexus requirement in the EPA
Final SEP Policy may not adequately serve environmental jus-
tice interests as it defines the “immediate geographic area” as
within a fifty mile radius of the violation’s location: such a broad
geographic nexus could leave affected communities unaided
by the SEP.  Final SEP Policy, supra note 2, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,798.












in the first place.153   A particular example of
restorative justice is the policy goal of envi-
ronmental justice.154   Historically, communi-
ties that endure significant pollution expo-
sure are disproportionately minority and/or
low-income populations.155  Judicious use of
geographically tied SEPs helps ensure that
the communities bearing the burden of en-
vironmental degradation will have the oppor-
tunity to directly benefit from sanctions
against violators.156   Moreover, SEPs can also
be designed to go beyond the relief obtain-
able in a traditional punitive action, to rectify
past degradations beyond mere compliance
with current standards.157
In conjunction with positive community
reaction, regulators may also benefit from the
perspective of the public choice theory of
assessing the actions of government officials.
The community may recognize that regula-
tors have created tangible environmental
benefits locally; additionally, regulators may
meet with greater approval from local gov-
ernment and community representatives.
“[T]hat political backing,” according to one
enforcement attorney, “may translate into
more resources for the regional or local of-
fices responsible for the SEPs and perhaps
even for the agency as a whole.”158
Finally, SEPs benefits violators them-
selves, by repairing corporate images
harmed by negative environmental public-
ity.  SEPs may also lead to greater efficien-
cies by allowing businesses to reevaluate
and improve their current infrastructure, in
advance of regulatory requirements.  In sum,
SEPs can give rise to win-win situation for
all parties involved: regulators, industry, the
community, and the environment.
The Risks of SEPs
Critics of SEPs argue that SEPs may be
too much of a “win” for violators, and fail to
maintain the deterrent effect that is the
raison d’etre of environmental regulation.
SEPs raise the possibility of
underdeterrence by opening up the possi-
bility for opportunistic violators to reduce
the actual cost of the environmental pen-
alty, as well as the possibility of tax deduc-
tions for SEP costs. 159   To counteract this,
many SEP policies prevent the violators from
benefiting too strongly from the performance
of a SEP. For example, instead of allowing
violators to benefit from a public perception
that they are actually environmental bene-
factors by their publicizing SEPs, SEP poli-
cies usually require violators to indicate that
the SEPs have been undertaken as part of
an enforcement agreement.160
In addition, the allowance of a SEP as
part of an enforcement action is a discre-
154. New Mexico, Massachusetts, Oregon, Con-
necticut , Colorado, Utah, Florida, and Virginia expressly
implicate environmental justice in their SEP policies.
155. Final SEP Policy, supra note 2, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,797.
156. At the same time, an overly tightly applied
nexus requirement could result in SEPs that do not ad-
dress cumulative impacts to a broader environmental
justice community; similarly, a nexus requirement ap-
plied solely to the media or pollutant could result in
SEPs not redressing harm experienced by a geographi-
cally proximate environmental justice community.
157. Droughton, supra note 93, at 809.
158. Dana, supra note 96, at 1200.
159. While EPA’s SEP penalty calculations take
into account the possible deductibility of SEP costs,
state policies vary.
160. Final SEP Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,803.  See,
e.g., ID. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, GD98-1: SUPPLEMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS (March 3, 1997), available at http:/
/www.deq.state.id.us/about/policies/gd98_1.cfm
(last visited April 24, 2005) (requiring identification
of fact that SEP is part of the settlement of an en-
forcement action, and citation to the statute violated);
OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, INTERNAL MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVE
– CIVIL PENALTY MITIGATION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PROJECTS (Sept. 26, 2000), at 4, available at http://
www.deq.state.or.us/programs/enforcement/
enforcementSEPDir.pdf (last visited March 26, 2005).
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tionary decision left up to the regulatory
agency.161   Under most SEP policies, if the
agency believes that a proposed project
would fail to provide a sufficient deterrent
effect, then the agency will not permit the
project and instead demand the full pay-
ment of the civil penalty.  For example, if the
proposed project primarily benefits the viola-
tor, rather than the environment or the public
health, then it will not be approved as a
SEP.162   Similarly, if a project is approved but
the agency finds that it still benefits the viola-
tor, those benefits will often be given a mon-
etary value which the agency will then deduct
from the mitigation amount of the SEP.163
The capacity for underdeterrence is
particularly acute as the SEP cost itself is a
new source of regulatory uncertainty:  usu-
ally, SEP costs are assessed and reported
by the violator, and the regulator has no
mechanism for confirming the reported fig-
ures.164  Opportunistic violators may overes-
timate SEP costs in order to receive greater
relief from the calculated penalty, or they
may underreport the business benefits of
SEPs. 165  In order to track SEP implementa-
tion, many state SEP policies require the
submission of detailed cost estimates and
certifications of progress, as well as provide
for stipulated penalties for SEPs that end
up costing less than estimated, but their
efficacy against opportunistic violators has
not been answered in the literature.166
Another criticism of the SEP system is
that it creates inconsistency in enforcement,
apart from the problem of the opportunis-
tic violator.  Because regulators cannot ac-
curately assess all of the relevant variables
for penalty calculations (or the collateral
economic benefits conferred to the violator),
the resulting inaccuracy of penalty assess-
ments creates inconsistency in the applica-
tion of regulations.167  The imposition of a
SEP with its penalty calculations adds an-
other layer of uncertainty and possibility of
error to this enforcement picture.  Apart from
the inherent inequity in inconsistent penal-
ties across violators, overly light penalties
effectively confer unfair economic advantage
over competitors, who have made the re-
quired expenditures to comply with environ-
mental regulations.  In addition, the possi-
bility that some violators might receive
lighter penalties could induce risk-tolerant
would-be violators to adopt a different com-
pliance strategy.
While some proponents of SEPs argue
that SEPs encourage early adoption of in-
novative pollution prevention technology
(“anticipatory compliance”); others opine,
“SEP programs may actually discourage
regulated entities from adopting environ-
mental improvements on their own (that is,
without government inducement).”168  A vio-
lator that knows it may obtain reduced pen-
161. Final SEP Policy, supra note 2, 63 Fed.Reg. at
24,797; CONN. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, POLICY ON SUPPLE-
MENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS 1 (Feb. 15 1996), available
at http://dep.state.ct.us/enf/policies/sep.pdf (last vis-
ited April 24, 2005).
162. CONN. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, supra note
161, at 5; OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 160, at
3 (Sept. 26, 2000).
163. See, e.g., Final SEP Policy, supra note 2, 63
Fed.Reg. at 24,801 (offsetting the value to the viola-
tor of the SEP from the SEPs cost, before calculating
the mitigation amount).
164. Dana, supra note 96, at 1209.
165. Id.; another commentator points out the related
problem of a violator concealing plans to implement an
environmental project, and receiving SEP mitigation credit.
David L. Tanenholz, Supplemental Environmental Projects: EPA’s
Efforts to Transform the Invisible Hand into a Green Thumb, 5 ENVTL.
LAW 633, 647-48 (1999) (citations omitted).
166. Final SEP Policy, supra note 2, 63 Fed.Reg at
24,803; CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CAL/EPA RECOMMENDED
GUIDANCE ON SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS 7-8 (Oct.
2003), available at http://www.calepa.ca.gov/Enforce-
ment/Policy/SEPGuide.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2004).
167. Dana supra note 96, at 1208.
168. Id. at 1216.












alties through SEP settlements might delay
investments in environmentally beneficial
projects until it has a civil penalty that it can
be offset against.  This violator may achieve
a noncompliance benefit over its competi-
tors by using those funds for other ventures;
the violator later achieves its original plans
for environmentally beneficial projects by
carrying them out as a SEP.169
Regarding this concern, many SEP poli-
cies explicitly state that violators cannot per-
form SEPs projects that the violator had in-
tended to implement prior to the enforce-
ment action.170   However, it is unclear how
well this provision of a state’s SEP guidelines
can be enforced.  Regulators may be unable
to accurately assess whether the violator
would have undertaken the SEP proposed
in the absence of the enforcement action.171
The danger of a violator benefiting from imple-
menting pre-enforcement plans for an envi-
ronmentally beneficial project as a SEP
seems difficult to guard against completely.
Community groups have several distinct
criticisms of SEPs as well, closely mirroring
complaints about the consideration of envi-
ronmental justice issues in environmental
agency permitting decisions.  For one, they
argue that their lack of technical expertise ren-
ders their involvement in the SEP approval
and implementation process less than mean-
ingful, and that community groups receive late,
if any, notice about impending SEP negotia-
tions.172   In addition, at least on the federal
level, the intricacies of the federal SEP require-
ments complicate community groups’ at-
tempts to generate project ideas for SEP li-
braries.173   EPA’s implementation of Project
XL is a front-end approach encouraging co-
operative regulation, similar to the post-vio-
lation cooperative enforcement that are SEPs;
“regulators and regulated entities negotiate
site-specific environmentally-protective agree-
ments to relieve regulated entities of relevant
statutory requirements,” in advance of any en-
forcement action.174   Regarding Project XL,
community groups and others have ques-
tioned whether these forms of “contractarian
regulation” satisfy process concerns and bring
about measurable environmental benefits.175
In the eyes of community or environ-
mental activist organizations, prosecution
to its conclusion, rather than settlement
with SEPs, may be a preferred option.176
169. Id.
170. ME. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROJECTS POLICY 3 (June 15, 2000); MICH. DEPART-
MENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PROJECTS FOR PENALTY MITIGATION 3 (November 10, 1997),
available at http://www.deq.state.mi.us/documents/deq-
wmd-opmemo-sep.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
171. Dana, supra note 96 at 1219.
172. Telephone interview with Veronica Eady, General
Counsel, West Harlem Environmental Action (Jan. 5, 2005).
173. Id.
174. Jamie A. Grodsky, Environmental Protection as a
Jurisdynamic Experience: The Paradox of (Eco)pragmatism, 97 MINN.
L. REV. 1037, 1061 (2003).  See also Thomas E. Caballero,
Project XL: Making It Legal, Making It Work, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
399, 403 (1998); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental
Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Con-
trol, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 122-23 (1998).
175. Grodsky, supra note 174, at 1057-1062.
176. Zinn, supra note 147, at 101.  Zinn goes on to
observe that the close interaction between regulators
and the regulated industry may also give the impres-
sion of collusion: to reduce friction with industry, regu-
lators may be more willing to compromise with indus-
try to the detriment of their policy goals, according to
one skeptical state attorney.  Id.at 99.
The possibility of so-called “agency capture” is
broad based, extends well beyond the specific negotia-
tion of SEPs, and applies to all reductions of penalties,
however.  The unique capacity of SEPs to further agency
capture likely lies only in the (rare) possibility of regu-
lators approving SEPs that further their own program-
matic ambitions.  An example of this lies in the case of
the former insurance commissioner of California,
Charles Quackenbush, who mitigated claims against
insurance companies in exchange for their donations
to a network of non-profit organizations under his con-
trol, the proceeds of which were used to finance cam-
paign commercials supportive of his re-election bid.
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These critics are quick to note the propen-
sity of regulators to “become beholden to
private interest, undermining the [regula-
tory] agency’s legitimacy.”177   The broad
regulatory discretion and “opacity” of en-
forcement settlements prevent “third parties
from effectively monitoring enforcement and
allows agencies to favor industry without fear
of reprisal.”178   Without the input of envi-
ronmentalists or community groups to bal-
ance violators’ demands, the regulator is
more likely to favor the regulated industry.179
EPA’s Final SEP Policy and its extensions, as
well as some states, respond to this con-
cern with the recommendation of commu-
nity input as a curative counterweight.
Finally, SEP opponents argue that gov-
ernment grants (financed out of an environ-
mental penalty fund, as in Delaware) to regu-
lated entities for environmentally beneficial
projects would be a better means of promot-
ing environmentally beneficial projects and
would not weaken deterrence.180   Grant pro-
grams compel regulators to reject projects
“that do not offer a high level of environmen-
tal return per dollar expenditure” and to dis-
favor applicants without demonstrated com-
petence in implementing environmentally
beneficial projects.181   By only accepting
projects that offer a higher rate of environ-
mental return, “regulators conserve resources
in their limited grant budget for more prom-
ising projects” and help ensure that SEPs
redound to the public benefit.182
SEPs and the Separation of Powers
Legislatures are the only branch of gov-
ernment with control over the appropriation
of funds.  One commentator observes that
environmental agencies could be perceived
as circumventing the will of legislatures by
implementing SEPs and effectively aug-
menting their budgets.183   In Florida, viola-
tors provide “in kind” grants of materials and
labor directly to the state agency’s environ-
mental restoration projects; however, the
Florida state legislature expressly sanctions
this independent financing of agency pro-
grams.184   The issue cuts more deeply, how-
ever, in states where there is no express
authorization of agency augmentation of
their budgets.
The separation of powers consideration
is complicated further by the fact that ad-
ministrative agencies commingle the dispar-
ate roles of modern governance.  Environ-
mental agencies act as legislative bodies
when they make regulations; act as execu-
tives when they investigate statutory viola-
tions and enforce the laws; and once the
legal process ensues, take on a judicial role
in adjudging culpability and sculpting pen-
alties.  However, the principle of the sepa-
ration of powers is predicated on each
branch’s interest in checking the other
branches of powers.  Administrative agen-
cies have no such internal checks.
On the federal level, EPA’s nexus re-
quirement responds to this separation of
177 Zinn, supra note 143, at 111.
178. Id. at 102 , 127.
179. Id. at 109.
180. Dana, supra note 96, at 1216.  See Section IV,
“Model Practices,” for a fuller description of the Dela-
ware program, with its mandated community input
for project selection.
181. Id. at 1219.
182. Id.
183. Droughton, supra note 93, at 811 (“Of par-
ticular concern is that the EPA could use SEPs to
realize agency goals which go beyond addressing
the violation, thus circumventing the appropriations
process in contravention of the ADA.”).
184. The environmental agencies in Kansas and Penn-
sylvania also envision SEPs as a means of filling “gaps” in
the execution of their mission to protect the environment.












powers concern.185   The nexus requirement
justifies the SEP by connecting the SEP to
the underlying objectives of the statute that
has been violated.  For example, if the stated
purpose of a particular statute is to prevent
pollution in the water, then it may be argued
that a SEP intended to improve water condi-
tions would arguably not usurp a legislature’s
appropriation’s power, for that SEP is de facto
authorized by the organic statute.
In addition, EPA’s Final SEP Policy has
special approval requirements that must be
met before SEPs can be implemented.  For
example, the Final SEP Policy requires ap-
proval from EPA Assistant Administrator for
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance,
when a SEP does not meet all the SEP
guidelines.186   A common requirement in
state SEP policies is a detailed settlement
agreement that outlines the violator’s plans
for the SEP.187   Both requirements put the
government acts in the open, and solicit the
curative viewpoints of the legislature and
affected communities.
States tend to mirror the EPA guidelines
even though the states are not subject to the
same legal limitations.  By similarly adopt-
ing a form of nexus requirement in their SEP
guidelines, states ensure that only SEPs fur-
thering the aims embedded in environmen-
tal statutes (reflecting the input of legislative
bodies, community groups and others) are
approved.  And in those cases where the con-
nection to a statutory purpose is weak, the
involvement of community input and legis-
lative oversight helps to restore the separa-
tion of powers through a simulation of the
open process that attends the creation of
laws and regulations.188   This helps ensure
that SEPs benefit the public, and not exclu-
sively private or regulatory interests.
Summation
The promulgation of formal, and pub-
lic state SEP policies expressly counter many
of the foregoing concerns.  However, thir-
teen states approve SEPs without a formal,
published SEP policy on the books to set
out the parameters, standards and proce-
dures for SEP approvals.189   Without a for-
mal SEP policy, the application of hidden
standards to individual cases may create a
perception of irrationality and unfairness by
creating unbalanced costs and benefits.190
In addition, without a formal policy or
guidelines, individual violators may be
treated differently, and unfairly relative to
other violators in similar positions.
185. While the nexus requirement was devised
in response to the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, which
requires any civil penalty to be paid to the U.S. Trea-
sury, it also plays a role in addressing the concern for
the separation of powers.
186. Final SEP Policy, supra note 2, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,804.
187. CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 166, at 7.
188. See, e.g., Illinois’s SEP program, affording the
Illinois legislature an opportunity to comment on pro-
posed SEPs.  Interview with William Ingersoll, Man-
ager of Enforcement Programs at the Illinois EPA (March
25, 2004) (on file with authors).  With respect to commu-
nity input, this prophylactic effect of open process point
may be an unanticipated, collateral consequence to
the primary purpose of community input, a purpose that
the EPA has identified as aimed at “addressing the
needs of the impacted community; promot[ing] envi-
ronmental justice” among other things.  Final SEP Policy,
supra note 2, 63 Fed.Reg. at 24, 803.
189. These states are set out in the forthcoming
fifty-state survey, available in the Summer of 2005 at
www.abanet.org/committees/irr/environmental.
190. Zinn, supra note 143, at 99-100.  The particu-
lar problem that some critics point to is the asymme-
try between the open process by which environmen-
tal statutes are enacted and the closed-door nego-
tiations where the settlement negotiations take
place.  Naturally, SEP policies such as the EPA’s,
which encourage public participation and commu-
nity input in the SEP process, rebut this concern.
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IV.  Model Practices of the Fifty States
Forty-seven states currently allow vio-
lators to perform some form of supplemen-
tal environmental project to reduce their
cash penalty.  While many have followed the
EPA’s articulation of federal SEP policy, some
states have promulgated significantly differ-
ent approaches to SEPs.  Of particular in-
terest are policies that permit states to use
their freedom from some of the strictures of
the federal system, notably nexus and the
prohibition against third party payments.
This section of the report will examine in
detail some of the unique policies and pro-
grams of the several states, with a view to-
wards providing policymakers, state regula-
tors, the affected communities, and the regu-
lated community with a palette of model
practices.  These practices meet the (often)
competing values of fidelity to the underly-
ing federal and state environmental statutes
that gave rise to the violation; the intent to
promote restorative justice to the commu-
nity affected by the underlying violations;
and the unique challenges states face in
enforcing environmental laws.
This section will lead off by articulating
various sets of values that justify the model
SEP practices. The first set of values is the
most aspirational, utilizing SEPs to further
larger processes and goals, including restor-
ative justice, environmental justice and a
new model of environmental enforcement.
The second set of values asks the fundamen-
tal question: what issues are unique to the
states in their enforcement of state and fed-
eral environmental laws with smaller viola-
tions and numerous jurisdictional bound-
aries?  The third set of values seeks to en-
sure that SEPs “first, do no harm”191  to the
goals of environmental laws, their enforce-
ment and the orderly process of adminis-
trative action.  Finally, this section will iden-
tify model practices that further each set of
articulated values.  The order of their pre-
sentation does not represent any attempt
at ranking the practices according to any
quantitative or qualitative measure.
1.  Towards a New Enforcement Model
“. . . as a matter of public policy, simply
depositing civil penalties into the vast
reaches of the United States Treasury does
not seem to be the most effective way of
combating environmental problems caused
by a specific polluter.”
– United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc.,
982 F. Supp. 373, 375 (E.D. Va. 1997).
The first set of values are concerned
with extending environmental enforcement
beyond the punitive to the remedial, and
encompass the collaborative model of en-
gagement between the regulator and the
regulated community.  These values share
the common element of re-conceptualizing
environmental violations as being against
a particular community, and not solely
against the common good.  The older model
is characterized by centralized regulation,
with penalty schemes resulting in fines
based on localized violations being funneled
to the general treasury. 192   The emerging,
collaborative model emphasizes corporate
self-regulation, disclosure, and collaborative
problem-solving, reshaping the
government’s primary role into “catalyzing
and enforcing such self-regulation.”193
191. This medical maxim is attributed variously
to Hippocrates’s OF THE EPIDEMICS, or to the Roman phy-
sician, Galen. See W.A. Drew Edmondson,
HEALTHCARE AND THE LAW: Improving End-of-Life
Care: The Role of Attorneys General, 27 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV.
911, n.4 (2002).
192. Daniel A. Farber, Symposium: Innovations in
Environmental Policy: Triangulating the Future of Reinven-
tion: Three Emerging Models of Environmental Protection, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 61 (2000).
193. Id. at 62, 69.












Various notions of justice may be fur-
thered by SEPs: the doctrines of restorative
and social justice from criminology are par-
ticularly relevant.  In addition, as noted in
Section III, proponents of SEPs consider
them vital in the effort to build greater com-
pliance through better relationships among
the regulator, the regulated community and
local communities.
Restorative and Environmental Justice
SEPs present an opportunity to
achieve restorative justice, a term borrowed
from criminal justice theory, with goals more
restitutionary than retributive in treating
crime and the communities affected by
crime.  One implication of restorative jus-
tice is that “government should surrender
its monopoly over responses to crime to
those who are directly affected by the crime
—the victim, the offender, and the commu-
nity.”194   In the context of environmental vio-
lations, the concept of restorative justice
dovetails with the use of SEPs, which focus
on restoring the environmental quality of
affected communities and can help
reconceptualize the relationship among
regulator, violator, and the affected commu-
nity.  Analogously to the criminal justice
realm, SEPs dilute the monopoly of the gov-
ernment regulator over the environmental
crime, and open the door to the involve-
ment of community groups and citizens.
Environmental justice, which seeks to
protect minority and low-income communi-
ties from disproportionate amounts of envi-
ronmental degradation, represents a sub-
category of restorative justice.195  One com-
mentator has styled environmental justice as
“an ethical challenge to the existing environ-
mental regulation paradigm.”196   Use of SEPs
to redress environmental injustices resolves
a tension inherent in the majoritarian aims
of environmental regulation (protecting the
common good as a whole against bad ac-
tors) and the race and class-based aims of
the civil rights movement.197  SEPs present
an opportunity for affected communities to
regain environmental equity.
Open questions remain, however, as to
how the “community” should be defined
and what an acceptable standard for jus-
tice might be, as the government no longer
monopolizes the negotiation of sanctions.
Violators are interested in seeing procedural
safeguards against inequities in the impo-
sition of penalties as the government’s mo-
nopoly on sanction recedes.
Social Justice
In contrast to restorative justice, the
theory of “social justice” operates more
broadly, stemming from the belief that there
exists “a societal obligation (not just an in-
dividual one) to provide appropriate rem-
194 Leena Kurki, Restorative and Community Justice
in the United States, 27 CRIME & JUST. 235, 236 (2000).
195. The Executive Order on Environmental Justice
directs federal agencies, including U.S. EPA, “[t]o great-
est extent practicable and permitted by law . . . [to] make
achieving environmental justice part of its mission by
identifying and addressing, as appropriate, dispropor-
tionately high and adverse human health or environmen-
tal effects of its programs, policies, and activities on
minority populations and low-income populations.” Exec.
Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
196. Clifford Rechtschaffen, Philosophy Meets Policy:
Giving Concrete Content to Abstract Ethical Norms: Advancing
Environmental Justice Norms, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 96 (2003).
197. Tseming Yang, The Form and Substance of Envi-
ronmental Justice: the Challenge of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 for Environmental Regulation, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 143 (2002).  The two movements are not always in
conflict:  open information about environmental risks
promotes both the environmental justice movement
and the majoritarian political process, but environ-
mental justice advocates would argue that majority
rule has failed minority and low-income populations,
resulting in disproportionate concentrations of toxins
and health risks in those communities.
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edies for harm to others caused by legal,
moral, or cultural structures instituted by
society.”198   At its broadest, this notion of jus-
tice could justify a wide variety of SEP projects
at the state and local level, particularly in
states not restricting SEPs to the nexus re-
quirement.  The value promoted would sup-
port a wide variety of SEP policies and prac-
tices, but would run counter to the notion of
protection of the commons, which lies at the
heart of traditional environmental regulation.
By loosening the connection between a spe-
cific injustice and its remedies, the broad
notion of social justice could operate in a
redistributive fashion, potentially cutting




A variety of regulatory mechanisms can
ensure that affected communities receive
environmental benefits from SEPs.  For one,
the nexus requirement can be tightened to
be a tool to achieve restorative justice: SEPs
could be required to have a geographical
connection to the community affected by the
violation, at least in those cases where a mi-
nority or low-income population was affected
by the violation.199   In mandating a tighter
nexus than EPA, states could further the aims
of the environmental justice movement.
At the same time, other commentators
suggest that the nexus requirement may
impede SEPs that could promote environ-
mental justice, and advise that the EPA
nexus requirement be relaxed in cases
where the SEP furthers environmental jus-
tice.200   The project would not be required
to have a nexus with the violation, but
would “advance the SEP goals of protect-
ing and enhancing public health and the
environment.”201  While states are largely at
liberty to relax the nexus requirement, the
authors found no instances of states pur-
suing this strategy.
In practice, efforts by the states to pro-
mote environmental justice fall into two cat-
egories, either providing a preference for
projects that advance environmental justice,
or extending bonus mitigation credit for
SEPs promoting environmental justice.  The
first approach, followed by Massachusetts,
Oregon, and Connecticut, promotes envi-
ronmental justice through the completion
of SEPs.202   For example, Connecticut’s SEP
Policy favors pollution prevention projects,
“especially a pollution prevention project
that positively impacts communities where
environmental equity may be an issue.”203
And while these states indicate that envi-
ronmental justice is an “overarching goal,”
these states do not list environmental jus-
tice as a category of SEP nor consider it as a
formal factor in determining whether to al-
low a SEP or mitigate a penalty.204
198. David A. Brennan, Tax Expenditures, Social Justice,
and Civil Rights: Expanding the Scope of Civil Rights Laws to Apply
to Tax-Exempt Charities, 2001 B.Y.U.L. REV. 167, 172 n.14 (2001).
199. This proposal emanates from several
sources, including a representative of a regulated
industry as well as from the federal enforcement at-
torneys. Interview with Robert L. Harris, Vice Presi-
dent of Environmental Affairs, PG&E (Nov. 17, 2004);
conference call with John Cruden, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice (May 13, 2004).
200. Meredith L. Flax and Benjamin F. Wilson,
Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects to Address Envi-
ronmental Justice, available at http://www.bdlaw.com/
media/news/news.287.pdf  (last visited April 9, 2005).
201. Id.
202. Selket Cottle, State Supplemental Environmental Project
Laws and Policies that Address Environmental Justice, available at
http:// www.abanet.org/irr/committees/environmental/
newsletter/dec03/StateSEPS.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2005).
203. CONN. DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, supra note 161, at 6.
204. E.g, MASS. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, INTERIM POLICY ON
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS, available at http://www.state.
ma.us/dep/enf/enf97005.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2005).












Mirroring the EPA’s approach, New
Mexico, Colorado, Utah, Florida, and Vir-
ginia use environmental justice as a factor
in determining the appropriate penalty miti-
gation that a violator will receive for its
SEP.205   The SEPs that perform well on the
environmental justice factor will earn a
higher mitigation ratio.206   In Colorado and
Utah, projects that “mitigate damage or re-
duce risk to minority or low-income popu-
lations that have been disproportionately
exposed to pollution, or are at environmen-
tal risk,” are accorded a greater degree of
penalty reduction.207   In Virginia, in order
for a SEP to be approved, it is necessary that
the “appropriateness and value” of the
project be taken into account; and in so
doing, the Virginia statute requires that the
impact on “minority or low-income popula-
tions” be taken into consideration, among
other factors.208
SEP Idea Libraries to Solicit Input from Af-
fected Communities
The EPA’s guidelines are premised on
a violator, and not the regulator, proposing
a particular SEP (see Section II, “The Fed-
eral Law of SEPs” for a discussion of federal
law as it applies to SEPs.)  Some states have
adopted this model, and mandate that vio-
lators voluntarily propose and execute SEPs,
born of a concern for the separation of pow-
ers between the legislative branch with its
power of the purse and the executive agen-
cies charged with implementation.209   Con-
sequently, the administrator is protected
against charges that she is implementing
her own programmatic agenda under the
guise of environmental enforcement.  Some
states dispense with this “voluntary” model
entirely, and solicit the cooperation of vio-
lators in implementing SEPs that meet
agency goals, resulting in projects for which
the agency would not otherwise have fund-
ing or staffing (e.g., Florida).210
Other states have hit upon a middle
position, creating “SEP idea banks” or pre-
approved lists of possible SEPs, for viola-
tors to choose from, as described below.
Regulators avoid the perception that the
department is indirectly appropriating funds
for projects that the legislature has not au-
thorized, particularly when the project ideas
themselves emanate from non-governmen-
tal organizations (“NGOs”) or local govern-
ment agencies.  The states are following the
lead of regional EPA offices: EPA has de-
fined SEP libraries as “an inventory of po-
tential SEPs that can be consulted in indi-
vidual cases where the defendant requests
assistance in identifying appropriate SEPs.”
211   EPA notes that a “SEP library can in-
clude specific projects identified as priori-
ties by communities, non-governmental or-
ganizations, and others.  SEP libraries can
be developed from project ideas, obtained
from the affected community through town
meetings, publications, the internet [sic], or
public hearings.”212
205. Cottle, supra note 202.  See, e.g., NEW MEXICO
AIR QUALITY BD., CIVIL PENALTY POLICY 29, available at http:/
/www.nmenv.state.nm.us/aqb/enforce_compliance/
Civl-Penalty.pdf (last visited April 24, 2005).
206. Id.
207 COLO. DEP’T OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT,
supra note 150, at 7.
208. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1186.2(C) (West 2004).
209. WA. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, SETTLEMENT GUIDELINES 4
(Feb. 1995) (on file with authors) (agency staff is
barred from proposing specific projects and may only
inform the violator about the types of activities the
agency has agreed to previously).
210. FL. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, PROGRAM DIRECTIVE
SETTLEMENT GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES 19-
20 (Jan. 24, 2002), available at http://www.dep. state.fl.us/
admin/depdirs/pdf/923.pdf (last visited April 24, 2005).
211. Interim Guidance for Community Involvement, su-
pra note 54, 68 Fed. Reg. at 35,887.
212. Id.
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The states of Delaware, Maine, and Illi-
nois have SEP libraries.213   Each encourages
local environmental and community groups
to submit proposed projects, usually
through web-based forms.  Illinois’ Environ-
mental Protection Agency has established
procedures to determine whether projects
are needed and desired.214   The agency re-
ceives feedback from the state legislature,
environmental groups, and the regulated
community, with the benefit that the agency
is seen as only approving SEPs that have
been validated by the larger community.
Under the Illinois model of SEP libraries, the
local community groups may assume re-
sponsibility for implementing these
projects.215   Notably, the Illinois idea bank
sets out detailed project descriptions, in-
cluding cost projections.216
The benefits of SEP libraries are two-
fold. First, they ensure that projects actu-
ally redound to the benefit of local commu-
nities by soliciting community group pro-
posals. Whereas community groups may
lack the technical expertise to respond to a
myriad of possible projects proposed by vio-
lators, the community groups are likely ca-
pable of marshalling the resources to iden-
tify a few discrete environmental projects,
and to put forward a short description of
the projects’ benefits and timetable.217  Sec-
ond, the proposals reduce transaction costs
for all parties, as there is no need to make
under-informed and uncertain predictions
about the risks and benefits of projects as
they arise in the course of settlement nego-
tiations.  Since the projects have already
been developed, violators may select and
implement a project free of the risks of de-
lay and additional negotiation.  One com-
mentator has also noted that
“[d]evelopment of SEP [libraries] would help
eliminate defendants’ reluctance to partici-
pate in the SEP process by reducing the
amount of resources defendants would have
to spend on outreach efforts and by giving
defendants an idea of a potential SEP project
without involving the community and thus
potentially raising expectations.”218
Towards a New Collaborative Compliance
Model
Scholarly journals and policy articles
discuss the possibility of reshaping the re-
lationship among the regulator, the regu-
lated community, and the affected commu-
nity to increase joint efforts at effective and
213. ME. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, SEP PROJECT REG-
ISTRATION, http://www.maine.gov/dep/oc/sep/
index.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2005); ILL. ENVTL. PRO-
TECTION AGENCY, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT IDEA
BANK, http://www.epa.state.il.us/enforcement/sep/
(last visited Mar. 15, 2005); DEL. DEP’T OF NATURAL RE-
SOURCES & ENVTL. CONTROL, POLICY ON PENALTY ASSESSMENTS
ASSOCIATED WITH ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, http:/
/www.dnrec.state.de.us/dnrec2000/admin/enforce-
ment/penaltyassessment penaltyassessmentpolicy.
htm (last updated Mar. 31, 2003 ) (Delaware caps the
cost of any project at $100,000).
214. Interview with William Ingersoll, Chief Le-
gal Counsel (Acting), Ill. Envtl. Protection Agency
(March 25, 2004).
215. Ill. Envtl. Protection Agency, Supplemental En-
vironmental Project Idea Bank, http://www.epa.state.il.us/
c g i - b i n / e n / s e p / s e p . p l ? r m = s h o w _ l i s t &
Submit=View+Projects (last visited Mar.15, 2005).
216. Id.
217. Insufficient technical and financial re-
sources have compromised effective public partici-
pation by community groups in EPA’s Project XL, and
in the environmental justice movement generally.
See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, BUILDING CAPACITY TO
PARTICIPATE IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ACTIVITIES:
A NEEDS ASSESSMENT ANd Analysis 3 (1999), available at
http://www.eli.org/pdf/rrcapacity99.pdf (last visited
Mar. 15, 2005) (citing John Clayton Thomas, Public Par-
ticipation in Public Decisions: New Skills and Strategies for
Public Managers, at 25-26 (1995)).
218. Flax and Wilson, supra note 200, at 4.












efficient stewardship of the environment.219
SEPs are highlighted as a tool in this col-
laborative effort through their use as a nego-
tiated settlement, their community involve-
ment, and the prospect for the creation of
innovative environmental solutions by the
regulated community, in contrast to penal-
ties meted out by enforcement personnel.220
A concrete example of this new model
of environmental regulation is evidenced in
the New Hampshire Department of Environ-
mental Services’ SEP policy, which treats
polluters who self-report violations preferen-
tially.  Under the New Hampshire guidelines,
self-reporting violators may receive a greater
mitigation amount for their SEPs: they pay
either the greater of economic benefit re-
ceived from the violation or 15 percent of the
gravity component for self-reported viola-
tions, as opposed to the higher penalties for
violations that are not self-reported—the
greater of the economic benefit plus 10 per-
cent of the gravity component or 25 percent
of the gravity component, if a SEP is included
in the settlement.221   Oregon favors self-re-
ported violators for SEPs, although no pref-
erential mitigation is accorded.222
The new compliance model is not ex-
tended to all violators.  Oregon withholds
SEPs from violators that have willfully or
intentionally breached environmental laws,
or are recidivists.223   Kansas presents a varia-
tion on this model, as its Bureau of Waste
Management affords an escalating mitiga-
tion ratio scale for repeat offenders: ordi-
narily, corporate violators receive a 3:1 miti-
gation ratio, while repeat offenders must
spend $5 before offsetting $1 from their as-
sessed penalties.224
State SEP Funds to Redress Environmental
Degradation in Affected Communities
A 2004 law in Delaware authorizes the
funding of SEP-styled projects by using vio-
lators’ penalties.225   The Delaware legisla-
ture created the Community Environmen-
tal Projects fund, authorizing the Delaware
Department of Natural Resources & Envi-
ronmental Control  (“DNREC”) to separate
out 25 percent of all civil and administrative
environmental penalties.226   The monies are
dedicated, at DNREC’s direction, to envi-
ronmentally beneficial projects redressing
environmental degradation within the same
community where the violations occurred
that resulted in the civil or administrative
penalty.227   The law further specifies project
categories similar to the EPA Final SEP Policy,
in requiring that projects must effect “pollu-
tion elimination, minimization, or abate-
ment, or improving conditions within the
219. See, e.g., Droughton, supra note 93, at 823-824;
Christopher D. Carey, Negotiating Environmental Penalties:
Guidance on the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects
44 A.F. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) (“A benefit shared by the
regulator and the regulated entity is the enhancement
of the regulatory relationship that is generally achieved
during the negotiation and accomplishment of a SEP.”),
cited by Dana, supra note 96, at 1211 (Dana notes that
there is no verified substantiation of “SEPs producing
attitudinal transformations”).
220. Kathleen Boergers, The EPA’s Supplemental Envi-
ronmental Projects Policy, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 777, 784-85 (1999).
221. N. H. DEP’T OF ENVTL. SERVICES, COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE
RESPONSE POLICY VI-16 available at http://www.des.state.nh.us/
legal/carp/carp-ch-6.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2005).
222. OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 160, at
2. (“SEPs will be looked on most favorably when a
Respondent has self-reported the violation and shown
willingness and effort to correct violations in a timely
manner once they are discovered.”).
223. Id.
224. KAN. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT, BUREAU OF
WASTE MANAGEMENT POLICY 00-03 RELATED TO SUPPLEMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT 2 (July 20, 2000), available at http:/
/www.kdhe.state.ks.us/waste/policies/BWM_00-
03_SEP.pdf (last visited Apr. 9. 3005).
225. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §6041 (West 2004).
226. Id.
227. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §6041(d).
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environment so as to eliminate or minimize
risks to human health, or enhancement of
natural resources for the purposes of im-
proving indigenous habitats or recreational
opportunities.”228
Significantly, the Secretary of DNREC
has a statutory responsibility to consult with
the Community Involvement Advisory Coun-
cil (CIAC) in deciding which projects should
be funded.229  CIAC’s overarching mission is
to serve as a liaison between the DNREC
and affected communities, with the further
charge that it ensure that “no community in
the State is disparately affected by environ-
mental impacts.”230   The legislature has
specified that the CIAC shall include “repre-
sentatives from communities, community-
based nonprofit organizations, environmen-
tal organizations, health care providers, lo-
cal government, academic institutions and
business/industry.  CIAC’s membership in-
cludes representatives of communities that
potentially may be adversely impacted by
environmental factors or conditions.”231
DNREC must submit quarterly reports to
the Governor and the legislature on the
progress of projects funded by the statute,
and the statute also requires annual reports
on the expenditures and the selection pro-
cess for the projects.232
This provision of law is not a SEP, of
course, as penalties are actually collected
and appropriated to perform environmen-
tally beneficial projects.  Nevertheless, this
practice illustrates the possibility of bring-
ing restorative justice to the fore, while en-
suring that transaction costs are kept to a
minimum.  It also achieves a significant level
of community input into, and community
benefit from, projects funded by the pro-
ceeds of environmental penalties.  It should
be noted, however, that violators lose the
public relations benefit of superintending
and publicizing an environmentally benefi-
cial project.
2.  SEPs for States’ Unique Issues
States also may diverge from the EPA
because states tend to deal with smaller vio-
lations, and smaller enforcement penalties,
as well as the greater likelihood of environ-
mental violations that cross jurisdictional
boundaries.  Smaller violators may require
special SEP treatment as they tend to have
smaller assessed fines, less ability to pay,
and less funding to make systematic
changes.  An official at Georgia’s Depart-
ment of Natural Resources noted that SEPs
may not benefit small companies as much
as larger companies because they tend to
lack the technical and financial abilities to
implement SEPs.233   Small companies also
may not benefit as much from good press.234
Furthermore, mitigation caps may be too
restrictive to implement a SEP with smaller
penalties.235  Small states, in particular, are
faced with the prospect of violations that
spread over state boundaries, triggering an
imperative to sculpt remedies that equita-
bly treat neighboring communities.
228. Id. at § 6041(b).
229. The CIAC has a consultative role, in assessing
whether a CEP grant affects the community that was
the geographic focus of the violation.  The CIAC mem-
bership is drawn from government, academia, commu-
nity groups, and industry.  DEL. DEP’T OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://
www.dnrec.state.de.us/ciac/ (last updated Mar. 4, 2005).
230. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 8016A (2004).
231. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 8016A(d).
232. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §6041(f).
233. Telephone Interview with John Fonk, Acting
Coordinator, Remedial Site Unit (March 2004).
234 Id.
235 Id.













Contributions to Third Parties to Implement
SEPs
SEPs for small violators may be facili-
tated through the practice of cash or in-kind
contributions to third parties.  Not only does
this permit a small violator to make a small
SEP contribution, but it leaves the imple-
mentation to an organization with proven
competencies in managing environmental
projects.  Additionally, third parties may
have experience in consulting with affected
communities, a competence that a violat-
ing entity may not possess.  This practice
represents a departure from the EPA’s
guidelines, which specifically prohibit con-
tributions to third parties in settlements
between EPA and violators.236
The Arkansas Department of Environ-
mental Quality allows violators to make cash
contributions to mitigate civil penalties so
long as the project advances environmental
interests, although this may result in a con-
tribution at a considerable geographical re-
move from the violation.237   In Vermont, a
penalty for an environmental violation can
include a “contribution toward other projects
related to the violation, which the respon-
dent and the secretary or the board agree
will enhance the natural resources of the area
affected by the violation, or their use and
enjoyment.”238   California also allows third
party contributions that satisfy its “enforce-
ment project” category.239   For example, a SEP
may include contributions to nonprofit or-
ganizations, such as the California District
Attorneys Association.240   New Hampshire
requires that the SEP be either a non-tax-
deductible direct cash payment to an ap-
proved charity or other non-profit organiza-
tion, or the purchase of a conservation ease-
ment or a parcel of land that is then made
subject to a conservation easement.241
Other states, notably Pennsylvania,
have heightened criteria to ensure that the
contributions will benefit the environment
as well as the affected community.  Penn-
sylvania requires that the donation must be
dedicated to a specified project, and not
merely to the general accounts of a non-
profit organization.242   In addition, the con-
tribution must fund projects related to the
public health or the environment.243
Not all states have chosen to permit
these kinds of SEPs: the Delaware statute
specifically prohibits payment to charities
or other entities as SEPs.244   It prohibits
performance by third parties in part because
the state would have no legal leverage over
third parties in case of underperformance.245
236. Final SEP Policy, supra note 2, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,781.
237. Ark. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROJECT (SEP) POLICY AND PROPOSAL GUIDELINES,
available at http://www.adeq.state.ar.us/legal/sep.htm
(last updated Apr. 28, 2004).
238. 10 VT. STAT. ANN.  tit 10, § 8007(b)(2) (2004).
239. CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 166, at 4.
240. Id.
241. N.H. DEP’T OF ENVTL. SERVICES, supra note 221, at VI-17.
242. PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, supra note 152, at 5.
243. Id.
244. DEL. DEP’T OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVTL. CON-
TROL, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE GUIDE, CHAPTER
8:  ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS ASSOCIATED WITH EN-
FORCEMENT ACTIONS 4, available at http://
www.dnrec.state.de.us/dnrec2000/admin/enforce-
ment/guide/chapter%20eight.pdf (last visited Mar.
20, 2005) (Delaware refers to SEPs as Environmental
Improvement Projects); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 29 §
8003(c)(15) (2004).
245. Id. at 4.
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Options to Facilitate SEPs for Small Viola-
tors
Several states have shown an interest
in facilitating small violators’ access to
SEPs.  One possibility is to allow small-vio-
lator SEPs to mitigate the entire cash pen-
alty.246   On the other hand, Indiana gener-
ally does not allow SEPs for penalties un-
der $10,000, which may effectively prevent
small violators from performing SEPs.247
Some states, such as Utah, permit full
mitigation of the penalty for all violators.248
The Kansas Bureau of Waste Management
restricts waiver of the entire penalty to small
businesses, preserving deterrence by requir-
ing the cost of the SEP to equal or exceed
twice the calculated penalty without the
SEP.249   The Bureau defines a small busi-
ness as either a facility with fewer than 100
full-time employees generating fewer than
1,000 kilograms of hazardous waste per
month, or a solid waste processing facility
accepting not more than twenty tons of solid
waste per day.250
Accommodating Transboundary SEPs
Unlike the federal government, the
states are continually confronted with
boundary issues with surrounding jurisdic-
tions, which may share the burden of envi-
ronmental violations.  A few states have
taken the lead in ensuring that the other
jurisdictions also benefit from SEPs.  For
instance, The Texas SEP policy allows for
the performance of SEPs in Mexico, sub-
ject to certain limitations.251   Because natu-
ral resources are shared between Texas
communities and their sister cities in
Mexico, “[i]t makes sense for these com-
munities to work together to preserve the
environment they share.”252   The project
must benefit the environment on the Texas
side of the border, and cannot benefit the
Mexican city at the expense of the Texas
sister city.253   The project must also address
a cross-border issue that is a problem of
strong concern to Texans.  To ensure that
a transboundary project can be imple-
mented, there must be both an existing
infrastructure in place in Mexico through
which the project can be performed, and
channels for international communication
about the project.254   The violator remains
responsible for the primary oversight and
implementation of the project.255
3.  Efficient and Effective Administration of
Environmental Laws (“First, do no harm”)
Responding to many of the concerns
set out in the Section III, “The Policy Impli-
cations of SEPs,” the authors have found
that some states have been particularly so-
licitous of the open, transparent and orderly
administration of enforcement authority in
the crafting of their SEP policies.  This in-
cludes maintaining the deterrent effect of
the underlying environmental laws.  Under-
246. On the other hand, the EPA always requires
a cash penalty to be paid. Final SEP Policy, supra note
2, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,802.
247. IND. DEP’T OF ENVTL. MGMT., NONRULE POLICY DOCU-
MENT, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT POLICY 7, avail-
able at http://www.state.in.us/idem/oe/nrp/
supplemental.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
248. The Utah Division of Air Quality policy al-
lows 100 percent of the gravity component to be off-
set by a SEP for small businesses and nonprofit enti-
ties.  UTAH DIVISION OF AIR QUALITY, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROJECTS POLICY 1 (on file with authors).
249. KAN. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT, supra note 224.
250. Id.
251. TEX. COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, USE OF SUPPLE-
MENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS 5, available at http://
www.tceq.state.tx.us/comm_exec/forms_pubs/pubs/

















neath this overarching goal are sub-values
such as ensuring the enforceability of a
particular SEP across its life cycle,
achieved through front-end screening and
oversight mechanisms.  Similarly, some
states have focused upon improving the
approval process, inter alia, creating open-
ness in a process that does not merit con-
fidentiality, given the public nature of
harms created by the violation of environ-
mental law.  Commentators term this
value “procedural justice,” referring to
“fairness in the decision-making process,
including the right of all members of the
public to meaningful participation in all
aspects of agency decisions.”256
Another value, reduction of transaction
costs, has as many dimensions to it as there
are stakeholders to the SEP itself—the regu-
lator, the violator and the affected commu-
nities.  Each has an interest in minimizing
the costs of negotiating, implementing, and
overseeing SEPs.  Some within the environ-
mental justice community contend that vio-
lators’ “unclean hands” render their trans-
action costs unworthy of concern, but vio-
lators would rejoin that they require SEP
negotiations to be resolved expeditiously to
permit them to clear their books of outstand-
ing liabilities without incurring significant
increases in attorneys’ fees.257   In any event,
should transaction costs and undue delays
attend the process of the SEP cycle, the
number of SEPs and their environmental
benefits would likely decline.
Practices
Oversight and Enforceability
An abiding concern for state regulators
and the regulated community alike is the
conversion of a dollar-certain and time-
bound enforcement penalty into a project
of indefinite liability and timeline.  Some
states have anticipated the need for finality
by implementing policies that rule out
projects with indefinite timelines, as well as
projects with possible detriment to the en-
vironment if left unfinished.  Connecticut’s
example is noteworthy, as the Department
of Environmental protection examines the
“worst case” scenario in determining
whether a SEP poses too many risks if “done
poorly or . . . left uncompleted at any time
during implementation.”258   This stringent
front-end requirement can prevent the
double blow of an environmental violation
compounded by further environmental deg-
radation from an ill-conceived or poorly ex-
ecuted SEP.  Maine also scrutinizes a
violator’s capacity to bring about a success-
ful SEP, predicating approval upon demon-
strated technical and economic resources
needed for implementation.259   Maine may
“require a letter of credit, escrow agreement,
or third-party oversight as part of this dem-
onstration.”260   By outsourcing the oversight
of SEPs to the University of Maine or other
branch of state government, and by charg-
ing those oversight costs back to the viola-
tor, Maine increases the possibility of suc-
cessful outcomes through the project man-
agement expertise and neutrality of the
third party.261
256. Rechtschaffen, supra note 196, at 99 (citing
Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30
Envtl. L. Rep. 10,681 (2000)).
257. Conference call with Chris Davis, Esq. (May
13, 2004).
258. CONN. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION supra note 161, at 2.
259. ME. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, SUPPLEMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS POLICY 3,6 (Sept. 17, 2004), avail-
able at http://www.maine.gov/dep/pubs/sep_pol.pdf
(last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
260 Id. at 3.
261. Id.
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In Pennsylvania, SEPs that might be re-
jected include projects with implementation
schedules of a year or more that require con-
tinued DEP oversight, projects that require
significant continuing DEP review and ap-
proval or oversight, overly complex or time-
consuming projects, and projects that are
difficult to value.262   In addition, to guard
against the risk that the SEP’s estimated cost
might not be borne out in the implementa-
tion, projects with difficult to quantify costs
may receive a lesser mitigation ratio.263
Transparency and Neutrality in the SEP
Approval Process
Transparency and the interposition of
neutral third parties into the approval pro-
cess are critical success factors for SEPs, in
part due to a need to preserve the symmetry
between the openness of the legislative pro-
cess establishing the environmental sanc-
tions and the enforcement process reducing
the full weight of those sanctions.264   Several
states have actively promoted transparency
through a variety of means, thereby combat-
ting the perception that environmental agen-
cies are letting violators off too lightly, as well
as rebutting the appearance of agency im-
propriety.  Several states interpose indepen-
dent committees and legislative bodies into
the SEP approval process, in part to inform
and circumscribe the discretion of environ-
mental agency personnel.  For instance,
262. PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, supra note 152,
at 5.  Connecticut expressly requires an estimate of
the amount of agency time required to negotiate and
oversee SEPs in determining whether to approve the
SEP. CONN. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, supra note 161.
263. PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, supra note 152, at 5.
264. Droughton, supra note 93, at 811 (“Of par-
ticular concern is that the EPA could use SEPs to
realize agency goals which go beyond addressing
the violation, thus circumventing the appropriations
process in contravention of the ADA.”).
265. FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, PROGRAM DIREC-
Florida’s version of SEPs, pollution preven-
tion projects, may require a more stringent
approval procedure, i.e., approval by the Of-
fice of General Counsel and notification of
the settlement to the Division Director.265
Paralleling the EPA practice of publish-
ing notice of impending consent decrees in
the Federal Register, the Louisiana legisla-
ture requires that proposed environmental
settlement agreements be published in the
newspaper closest to the site of the environ-
mental violation, giving the public 45 days
to comment.266   The Louisiana Department
of Environmental Quality provides a website
documenting proposed settlements, clearly
identifying those with beneficial environmen-
tal projects.267   In addition, the Louisiana stat-
ute requires any settlement agreements with
beneficial environmental projects and their
justifications to be forwarded to the Attor-
ney General for approval.268
Community Input
While discussed earlier as a means of
furthering restorative justice, community
input serves a different purpose, that of en-
suring that the process of negotiating SEPs
remains balanced and fair.  Community in-
put is vital during various stages of SEP
implementation.  The EPA’s Final SEP Policy
notes that “EPA should make special efforts
to seek input on project proposals from the
TIVE SETTLEMENT GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PEN-
ALTIES 21 (Jan. 24, 2002), available at http://
www.dep.state.fl.us/admin/depdirs/pdf/923.pdf (last
visited Mar. 20, 2005).
266. LA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, BENEFICIAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PROJECTS – FAQS, http://www.deq.state.la.us/enforcement/
BEP_Information_Suggestions_Proposals.asp?strRequest=faq
(last visited Mar. 20,2005).
267. LA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, SETTLEMENT AGREE-
MENTS, http://www.deq.state.la.us/enforcement/bep/
bep.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
268. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2050.7(E)(2)(a) (West 2004).












local community that may have been ad-
versely impacted by the violations,” particu-
larly in cases with a great range of possible
SEPs.269   EPA only solicits community in-
put after the violator indicates the intent to
perform a SEP and to seek community in-
put.270   EPA believes that community input
will promote environmental justice, will
likely result in SEPs that better improve the
affected community, and improve the rela-
tionship between the community and the
violator.271   To guarantee effective and mean-
ingful community input, EPA provides in-
formation about the SEP process to the com-
munity.272   Most critically, companies that
welcome public input on the selection of
projects are eligible for a greater mitigation
of their assessed penalties.273
Several states have taken the EPA’s
community input framework and extended
it.  The Colorado Department of Public
Health and Environment considers both
community input and environmental justice
in determining the degree of penalty miti-
gation.274   Specifically, the violator must ac-
tively solicit and incorporate input into the
SEP.275   The environmental justice factor
addresses damage or risk to minority or low-
income communities disproportionately af-
fected by the violation.276   In addition, the
Utah Division of Air Quality looks at the ex-
tent to which community input was consid-
ered in the SEP as a factor to determine the
mitigation percentage.277
As noted in greater detail in this sec-
tion, some states have chosen to create SEP
project libraries.  One variant of SEP library
actively solicits project descriptions from
community groups typically affected by en-
vironmental violations, building in front-end
input.  This mechanism imposes fewer costs
upon community groups, as they need not
respond to a myriad of distinct project pro-
posals, nor do the violators need to delay
settlements by engaging in protracted ne-
gotiations with community groups.
V.  Conclusion
SEPs can benefit all stakeholders in the
environment—affected communities, indus-
try and the regulators.  Moreover, the SEPs
process holds the promise of a re-invented
regulatory model, one of cooperative en-
forcement, rather than the procrustean stan-
dard of traditional top-down, “command
and control” regulation.  Each stakeholder
can benefit directly from the new model,
through projects that benefit the affected
community, improved public relations for
the involved industry, and improved support
for regulatory operations from industry and
the public.
That said, there are also pitfalls associ-
ated with SEPs.  There may be a need for
safeguards to insure that the public actu-
ally benefits from the SEP, not just the regu-
lators and industry.  To this end, commu-
nity groups should be offered meaningful
opportunities to comment on how their
269. Final SEP Policy, supra note 2, 63 Fed. Reg at
24,803; see also Interim Guidance for Community Involve-




273. Final SEP Policy, supra note 2, 63 Fed. Reg. at
24,802; Interim Guidance on Community Involvement, supra
note 54, 68 Fed. Reg. at 35,884.  While EPA encour-
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ages violators to gather community input, commu-
nity groups are not party to SEP negotiations.
274. COLO. DEP’T.OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT,
supra note 150, at 6-7.
275. Id. at 7.
276. Id.
277. UTAH DIVISION OF AIR QUALITY, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVI-
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communities could best benefit from SEPs.
Vigilant accounting of the implementation
of SEPs will provide an additional safe-
guard, as well as helping to ensure that the
acceptance of SEPs does not undercut the
deterrent effect of environmental laws.
This report has outlined a variety of
model practices that seek to accommodate
the demand for safeguards, without render-
ing the SEP negotiation effort too costly for
all concerned.  Some of these practices
streamline the process for negotiating SEPs,
recognizing that states are not bound by the
EPA’s SEP policies, and relaxing the require-
ments to meet the unique concerns of states,
such as smaller violators and violations.
Nexus, the core of the EPA’s SEP policies,
should remain a valuable element of state
SEP policies, however, given its vitality in a
wide variety of legal contexts and its role in
ensuring that affected communities them-
selves benefit from the SEPs.  Most of the
practices have the common thread of en-
hancing transparency and accountability in
the SEP negotiation process, thus assuring
that the open process attending the creation
of environmental standards also permeates
their enforcement.  These practices can help
ensure that the promise of SEPs is achieved
while limiting the associated risks.
Steven Bonorris, et al
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